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2009 Supreme(P&H) 1930

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Hemant Gupta, J.
Zile Singh
Versus
Avtar Singh
Civil Revision No. 6499 of 2009,
Decided On : NOVEMBER 10, 2009

The main legal point established is that the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act requires due diligence and good faith in prosecuting prior proceedings, and the court's inability to entertain the suit due to a defect of jurisdiction or a similar cause.

Headnote:

Limitation Act - Exclusion of Time - Section 14, Section 5 - 1963 - [RATIO DECIDENDI]

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, along with an application to exclude the time spent in prosecuting an earlier suit for permanent injunction. The application was dismissed, and the plaint for specific performance was rejected as barred by limitation.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the plaintiff failed to institute the suit for specific performance within the period of limitation, and thus, could not seek condonation of delay.

Issues: The main issue was whether the time spent in prosecuting the previous suit could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Act could be invoked only if the prior proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and good faith and if the court was unable to entertain the suit due to a defect of jurisdiction or a similar cause.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the order of the trial court.

Judgment

1. The challenge in the present revision petition is to the order dated 22.9.2009, whereby an application filed by the plaintiff-petitioner under Section 14 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [for short the Act] for exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting the suit for permanent injunction, was dismissed and as a sequel, the plaint of the suit for specific performance was rejected as barred by limitation.

2. The plaintiff has filed the present suit on 11.3.2002 for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 19.3.1990, along with an application under Section 14 read with Section 5 of the Act, to exclude the time spent in prosecuting his earlier suit for permanent injunction. The sale deed in pursuance of such agreement was to be executed on 1.6.1991.

3. The plaintiff-petitioner has earlier filed a suit for permanent injunction on 11.4.1990, before the date fixed for execution of the sale deed in terms, of agreement dated 19.3.1990, on the ground, that the defendant intends to sell the property to other persons even though he has entered into a agreement for sale with the plaintiff; in the written statement dated 4.9.1990, in the aforesaid suit, an objection was raised that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable in its present form Copy of the said written statement has been produced during the course of hearing. It was on 2.6.2001, the defendant filed an application in the aforesaid suit for permanent injunction that the suit is not maintainable as it was only suit for specific performance which was maintainable. On the said application, the learned trial court had passed an order on 11.2.2002 (Annexure P-4) rejecting the plaint. Thereafter the present suit has been filed after receipt of the certified copy of the order passed by the learned trial Court.

4. The application for exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the previous suit has been dismissed by the learned trial court on the ground that no liberty was granted to the plaintiff in the order dated 11.2.2002, to file the suit for specific performance. The Court has found that time spent in prosecuting the suit can be condoned if the delay was due to inadvertence and despite due diligence. It was found that the cause of action arose to plaintiff on 1.6.1991, that is the target date for execution of the sale deed but the plaintiff did not institute the suit for specific performance, within a period of limitation, therefore, the plaintiff cannot seek condonation of delay.

5. In Roshanlal Nuthiala and others v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 824, it was held that the defects that will attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called, but others, more or less neighbours, to such deficiencies. Any circumstance legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the Court of the dispute on the merits, comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch must inform the interretation of the Act, which deprives the remedy of one who has a right. While referring to the earlier judgment reported as Associated Hotels of India, Ltd. and another v. R.B. Jodha al Kuthalia, AIR 1961 SC 156, it was held that the question was one of the initial jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the proceedings.

6. In Deeha (dead) through L.Rs. v. Bharat Singh (dead) through L.Rs.,and others, (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 336 : (AIR 2002 SC 2768), it was held that the main factor, which would influence the Court in extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Act is that whether the prior proceedings have been prosecuted with due diligence and good faith. The expression "good faith" as used in Section 14 of the Act, means exercise of due care and attention and expression good faith qualifies prosecuting proceedings in the Court, which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. It was held to the following effect:

"15. The other expressions relevant to be construed in this regard are "defec




















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