Repeated appointments on a 89-day basis amounted to an unfair labor practice, and the termination of the respondent's services was in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

J.S.Khehar, J.

1. The petitioner-management inducted the respondent-workman Baljinder Singh into Class-IV service by an appointment letter dated March 9, 1995. A perusal of the appointment which has been placed on the record of this case as Annexure P2, reveals that the appointment of the respondent-workman was on 89 days basis, and that, his services would come to an end on the expiry of 89 days. It was also explicit in the letter of appointment, that in case a regular employee joins the service of the petitioner- management against the post held by the respondent-workman, then his services would be terminated. In furtherance of the aforesaid appointment letter, the respondent-workman assumed his duties on March 15, 1995 and was relieved on completion of 89 days on June 11, 1995. By an order dated June 21, 1995 the respondent-workman was again engaged on 89 days basis. He again assumed his duties as a class IV employee on June 22, 1995 and relieved on completion of 89 days service on September 18, 1995. In the same fashion, the respondent-workman was repeatedly appointed on 89 days basis from time to time i. e, by an order dated September 27, 1995 (which commenced on September 29, 1995 and concluded on December 26, 1995), and by another letter order dated December 28, 1995 (which commenced on December 29, 1995 and continued till March 27, 1996) and by yet another order dated April 9, 1996 (which commenced on April 9, 1996 and concluded on July 7, 1996). Since the employment of the respondent-workman was not extended after the last engagement vide order dated April 9, 1996 and because, his services were dispensed with on July 7 1996, he impugned the action of the petitioner-management in terminating his services by issuing a demand notice under Section 2-A the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated June 3, 2001. On the failure of the conciliation, proceedings, the dispute raised by the respondent-workman was referred for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bathinda (hereinfter referred to as the Labour Court). The Labour Court answered the reference in favour of the respondent workman on August 16, 2005. The Labour Court by its aforestated award, while holding that the termination of the services of the respondent-workman with effect from July 7 1996 was in violation of the provisions of the Act, ordered the reinstatement of the respondent-workman with continuity in service and 40 percent back wages with effect from the date of issuance of the demand notice i. e. with effect from June 3, 2001. The award of the Labour Court dated August 16, 2005 (Annexure PI) is subject matter of challenge through the instant writ petition.

2. The primary contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, that the respondent-workman was appointed as a class IV employee for specified tenure, and that his services were dispensed with on the culmination of the specified tenure. Thus viewed, it is submitted that the termination of the services of the respondent-workman cannot constitute retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, It is not possible for us to accept the instant contention for two reasons. From a perusal of the facts narrated hereinabove, it is apparent that the respondent workman was repeatedly appointed on 89 days basis. Such an act of repeated appointments with notional breaks amounts to an unfair labour practice. The Labour Court was fully justified in recording such a conclusion on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case.

3. Additionally, it would be pertinent to mention that the last tenure of appointment of the respondent-workman was based on an appointment letter dated April 9, 1996. The said appointment commenced on April 9, 1996 itself and culminated on July 7, 1996 i.e. well be on the period of 89 days specified in the said letter. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not open to the petitioner-ma