Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.

1. Kashmir Kaur, petitioner-respondent No. 1 filed an application for leading secondary evidence to prove agreement/compromise between the parties. The application was rejected by the trial Court by order dated 12.12.2001. It is this order which has been impugned by defendant No. 1 in this revision petition.

2. Plaintiff-respondents 1 and 2 filed a suit for declaration that they were owners of land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias and perpetual lessee of land measuring 40 Kanals on the basis of Will dated 29.5.1994 executed by one Inder Singh son of Ganga Singh. A prayer was also made for a decree for possession of two rooms in the house of the share of aforesaid Inder Singh. It was stated that mutation No. 2582 of inheritance of aforesaid Inder Singh sanctioned on 8.8.1994 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and subsequent resultant entries in the revenue record and registered sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 i.e. the petitioner in favour of defendant No. 4 in respect of 481/4856 share of aforesaid land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias on the basis of mutation No. 2582 and resultant mutations Nos. 2609 and 2608 sanctioned on 31.8.1995 were wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. As a consequential relief, it was also prayed that the plaintiffs were entitled for possession of land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias and 40 Kanals on the basis of their title.

3. In the application for leading secondary evidence, it was stated that a compromise had taken place between the parties whereby the plaintiffs had admitted ownership of defendants 1 and 2 over the suit property. In lieu of a tractor belonging to Inder Singh purchased by plaintiff No. 1, the plaintiff had agreed that after getting the land redeemed, the mortgaged property shall be handed over to defendants. It was stated that the said compromise had taken place in the presence of the Panchayat of three villages and the original compromise was in possession of the plaintiffs. It was further prayed that the plaintiffs be asked to produce the said compromise and in case they do not do so, the petitioner may be permitted to lead secondary evidence by producing photostat copy of the compromise.

4. The application was resisted by the plaintiffs. It was denied that any compromise had taken place between the parties or that the original compromise was with the plaintiffs. It was stated that if the petitioner possessed any compromise as has been stated by her, the same was a forged document.

5. The trial court declined petitioners prayer primarily on the ground that the factum of existence of the compromise had not been pleaded in the written statement and, therefore, the petitioner could not be permitted to lead secondary evidence in respect of such document which is not a registered document and had not been relied upon by her.

6. Shri Sukhbir Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner assailed the order of the trial Court and submitted that the application for leading secondary evidence has been erroneously declined as the petitioner in para 3(f) and (g) of the written statement had specifically pleaded regarding compromise between the parties. He next referred to the cross-examination of Sukhwant Kaur where a specific question regarding compromise had been put to her. The counsel then submitted that document of compromise did not require registration as the same was a memorandum of settlement and it did not create/extinguish any right so far as the land in dispute was concerned and it acknowledged the previous title of the parties. In support of this, the counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mool Chand v. Udho Ram (1994-2) 107 P.L.R. 736 and Bhagwan Singh v. Hardial Singh and Ors. The counsel also relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur and submitted that case of the petitioner is governed by Clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short "the Act") a