The prosecution in a criminal case must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish crucial elements, such as the specific date and time of the last payment, can lead to the dismissal of the appeal. Additionally, the maintainability of a criminal complaint filed by an unproved partner in a registered company/firm is crucial.

1. This appeal has been preferred by Kiran Finance Company, hoshiarpur through its Managing Partner, capt. Lakhwinder Singh Gill against order dated 26-2-2002 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Hoshiarpur, whereby respondent-Sukhdev Kishan was acquitted in a complaint case No.9 of 18-11-1999 filed under sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, "the Act" ).

2. The case of the complainant shorn of details, is like this : respondent-Sukhdev Kishan had purchased a Matador bearing Registration No. HP-20-1444 vide Hire Purchase Agreement (Ex. DX) dated 20-5-1996 for an amount of rs.3,20,000.00 . The said amount was to be paid in 36 installments. In the event of failure, 4% overdue charges were also agreed to be paid on the defaulted amount. To discharge his partial liability, respondent sukhdev Kishan had issued a cheque No.570893 dated 24-9-1999 worth Rs.85,000.00 to the complainant-appellant, but, the same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. A legal notice dated 11-10-1999 (Ex. C6) was issued to the respondent to make payment but, of no avail. Ultimately, on these aforesaid allegations, complainant-appellant had filed a complaint under Sec.138 of the Act. After recording the preliminary evidence, the respondent was summoned to face trial for commission of offence under sec. 138 of the Act.

3. In order to prove its case, the appellant examined as many as three witnesses, namely, CW-1 Lakhwinder Singh Gill, complainant, CW-2 Gurinderpal Singh, Special assistant of the Oriental Bank of Commerce, hoshiarpur, and CW-3 Naresh Pal, Clerk-cum-Cashier, State Bank of Patiala, Una.

4. After closure of the evidence by the appellant, the respondent was examined in terms of Sec.313 of the Code of Criminal procedure wherein, he denied the incriminating evidence appearing against him. In answer to the last but one question, the respondent submitted that the cheque in dispute, bearing his signatures only, was handed over to the appellant as a security and it was never issued by him in order to discharge the liability.

5. Learned trial Magistrate after appraisal of the evidence and hearing learned counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that the cheque (Ex. C2) dated 24-9-1999 worth Rs.85,000.00 was issued by the respondent in favour of the appellant but the same was issued when the debt taken by the respondent had already become timebarred. On this observation, no liability could be fastened upon the respondent under sec. 138 of the Act and as such, he was acquitted in the Complaint case. This is how feeling aggrieved, the appellant has come up in this appeal.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the file carefully.

7. The only contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that under Sec.19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time, when the last payment was made by the respondent to discharge his liability. He then made a reference to the cross-examination of the CW-1 Capt. Lakhwinder Singh Gill wherein he stated that the aforesaid Matador purchased by the respondent was returned to him (appellant) in September, 1999 and ultimately, the said vehicle was disposed of in an open auction on 18-10-2000 for a sum of Rs.30,000.00 . After making reference to the above answers given by the appellant in his cross-examination, learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the decision in S. Krishnamurthy V/s. A. R. Rajan, 1996 Cri LJ 3552 (Mad) and then contended that in the given circumstances, the trial court should have drawn an inference that the last payment was made on 18-10-2000 towards the debt liability and as such the cheque dated 24-9-1999 was issued well within the time and the complaint case was thus, also not time-barred though it is held to be time-barred by the trial Court.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent repelled the aforesaid point of argument raised on behalf