An agreement or compromise that reduces the employer's liability to pay the minimum compensation prescribed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is null and void and cannot be enforced.

V. K. Bali, J.

1. The appellant, mother of devinder Singh claimed compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000 in respect of death of her son, who died in an accident, stated to be then in the employment of Star Autos and Engineer on 17.12.1982. The Senior sub-Judge, Ropar, exercising the powers of Commissioner under the Workmens compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), consigned the file to records on 16.9.1986 when a cheque of rs.21,000 was deposited by the respondents by mentioning in the order that the claim stood fully satisfied. This order was challenged by the appellant in F. A. O. No.89 of 1987 along with an application for condonation of delay under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, as there was delay of 19 days in filing the first appeal. The first appeal and the application came up for hearing before the learned single Judge on 16.4.1987 and were dismissed. It is this order dated 16.4.1987 dismissing the first appeal and application for condonation of delay that has been challenged in this appeal filed by the appellant under clause x of the Letters Patent.

2. The sole contention of Mr. Ghai, learned counsel representing the appellant is that the compensation had to be assessed under sec. 4 of the Act read with Schedule IV, according to which the amount payable to the appellant comes to Rs.44,274. Inasmuch as the appellant has been paid a sum of Rs.21,000 only, i. e. , less than the compensation admissible under the provisions of sec. 4 read with Schedule IV of the Act, even if the Commissioner under the Act had allowed compensation to the tune of Rs.21,000 by way of compromise, the same needs to be modified so as to grant the minimum amount of compensation admissible under the statute, further contends the learned counsel. For his aforesaid contention, learned counsel relies upon a single Bench decision of this court in Mahinder Singh V/s. Dial Singh, 1973 ACJ 50 (Pandh ). Learned counsel representing the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the parties having arrived at a compromise, it was not necessary to adhere to the Schedule provided in the Act and that because of compromise arrived at between the parties, respondents had given up their defence on merits and, if the parties were to go to trial, sans compromise arrived at between the parties, it was possible that claim petition was dismissed and that being so, appellant cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the terms of compromise arrived at between the parties.

3. Before we might examine the contentions of the learned counsel, as noted above, it would be appropriate to mention that the claim of the appellant to the tune of Rs.2,00,000 was contested by respondent No.3 and in the written statement filed on behalf of the said respondent, various preliminary objections were raised. The relief sought for by the appellant was contested on the grounds that driver of the tractor was not holding any valid licence at the time of alleged accident and the deceased did not fall under the definition of workman as defined in the Act. It was further averred that no notice as required under sec. 10 of the Act was served by the appellant upon respondent No.2 and that the application was not maintainable in the present form as no contractual liability existed between the deceased and respondent No.2. It was further stated that the deceased was not acting in the employment of respondent No.1 at the time of alleged occurrence and as such the respondent No.2 was not liable to pay any compensation.

4. It requires to be mentioned that respondent No.2 National Insurance Co. Ltd. had ultimately made over a payment of rs.21,000 to the appellant before the commissioner under the Act. Records of the trial court would demonstrate that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed on 3.6.85. The matter was, however, adjourned thereafter from time to time and when it came up before the court on 20.8.1986, following order was passed:

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