An amendment of pleading should not be destructive of the original case and must not cause serious prejudice to the other party. The timing and bonafide nature of the application are crucial factors in determining the admissibility of the amendment.

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. Limitation on the scope of withdrawal of admission is the moot point for discussion in this revision.

2. Vide order dated 19th August, 1997, learned Additional Civil Judge, Gurdaspur, dismissed the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiff in the suit, petitioner herein.

3. In order to determine the controversy in issue, reference to basic facts would be inevitable. Mehar had filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from interfering into his possession over the suit land. Further, I was the specific case of the plaintiff that he and even his predecessor-in interest have been in cultivatory possession of the disputed land for more than 100 years. They have been occupying the land in their own right and the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 to 5 have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession.

4. Learned trial court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and referring to some judgments of this court and the Honble Apex Court dismissed the application for amendment. The main reason given in support of the order was that plaintiffs claim of adverse possession of the suit land and denying the title of the land lord was hit by the provisions of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, it was stated that it is withdrawal of admission to the prejudice of the other party.

5. At the out set, I must record that the impugned order does not suffer from any error which would call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

6. In the case of Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and Anr., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 46, it was laid down by the Honble Apex Court that an admission by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away; but it is equally a settled principle of law that such amendment should not be destructive of the original case pleaded by the party and must not cause serious prejudice to the rights of the other party in taking that party, by surprise. Furthermore, the amendment must be for well accepted reasons, which are in consonance with well established cannon of civil jurisprudence governing the subject matter of amendment.

7. Learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Hira Lal v. Kalyanmal and Ors., 1988(1) Supreme Court Cases 278 and a judgment of this Court in the case of Bimla Rani Ahluwalia v. Union of India (1998-3)120 Punjab Law Reporter 38, to argue that such amendment cannot be allowed at this stage of proceedings.

8. In the case of Hira Lal (supra), the Honble Supreme Court has held as under :-

" .... In the present case, once the defendants in their joint written statement clearly admitted that 7 properties out of 10 were joint family properties wherein the plaintiff had l/3rd share and they had 2/3rd undivided share, it must be held that there was no contest between the parties regarding 7 items of suit properties in Schedule A. The trial court was, therefore, justified in framing the issues concerning only remaining three items for which there was dispute between the parties...... Even the grounds made out in the application were not justified. Consequently, there is no question of taking an inconsistent stand which would not have affected prejudicially the plaintiff as wrongly assumed by the High Court. Consequently, it must be held that when the amendment sought in the written statement was of such a nature as to displace the plaintiffs case it could not be allowed . . . ."

9. Applying the above principle enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court, it is clear that the present application is not only legally sustainable but is also not even bonafide. If the applicant plaintiff was the tenant he would continue to be the tenant as "once a tenant is always a tenant". If he was a tenant and even his predecessor-in-interest were tenants, he obviously could not be raising claim of adverse possession denying the title of the