An appellate authority discharging quasi-judicial functions must provide reasons for its decisions and give parties an opportunity to fulfill statutory requirements.

G.S.Singhvi, J.

1. This is a petition to quash the order Annexure P-6 passed by the Municipal Corporation, Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) requiring the petitioner to pay enhanced house tax from 1.11.1991. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order Annexure P.9 dated 5.8.1997 passed by the Principal Secretary, Local Government, Punjab, dismissing the appeal filed by it against the order of assessment.

2. Admittedly, the petitioner owns commercial property bearing Municipal No. 117/1 situated in Hall Bazar, Amritsar. A major portion of the first floor of the property measuring 7144 Sq. feet is in the possession of Life Insurance Corporation as a lessee of the petitioner. Vide order Annexure-P.1 dated 14.12.1981, the respondent-Corporation assessed the petitioner for house tax. On 1.2.1984, notice Annexure-P.2 was issued by the respondent-Corporation for revision of the house tax. The proposed assessment was based on the rateable value of the property Rs. 3,74,665/- for the year 1983-84. The petitioner filed detailed objections to the proposed assessment through its Manager. Vide Annexure-P.4, the Executive Officer overruled the objections and fixed the rateable value of the property at Rs. 3,74,665/- w.e.f. 1.4.1983. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the Executive Officer was accepted by the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division, who remanded the case to the respondent-Corporation for fresh decision. On 3.2.1997, the Executive Officer of the Corporation passed the order Annexure-P.6 and determined only rental value of the property at Rs. 18,341/- per month (self-commercial) and Rs. 18,341/- (rented commercial). Feeling dissatisfied with the revised order of the assessment, the petitioner filed appeal under Section 146 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976). It also applied for stay of the proposed recovery of house tax. Vide order Annexure-P.9 dated 5.8.1997, the Principal Secretary, Local Government, Punjab, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner as not maintainable and also on merits.

3. The petitioner has challenged the impugned orders on various grounds set out in the petition but after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are convinced that the order passed by the appellate authority deserves to be set aside and it is not necessary to make adjudication on other ground of challenge raised in the writ petition.

4. A careful analysis of the order passed by the appellate authority shows that in first six paragraphs the learned Principal Secretary has briefly noticed the facts and the respective contentions urged on behalf of the parties and in the seventh paragraph he has recorded the following conclusion:-

"After going into the arguments adduced before me, the written material produced before me and the rulings as quoted, I feel that the appeal is not maintainable in the first instance, since the entire disputed amount of House Tax has not been deposited. The appellant admits that he has deposited the disputed tax only in respect of one year that is 1993-94. On the merits of the case I find that the Municipal Corporation enhanced the rent not by comparing with the actual rent received by the appellant for the first floor but by assessing the rental value on the basis of additions, alterations and renovations that would have taken place."

5. Shri M.L. Sarin criticised the order of the appellate authority by contending that it is violative of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, it does not contain reasons for not entertaining the appeal filed by the petitioner. He submitted that if the appellate authority formed an opinion that the appeal was not maintainable without prior deposit of the amount of house tax, then an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to remove the defect in the filing of appeal by depositing the amount of arrears. Learned counsel submitted that on 6.8.1996, the