PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
R.S.Mongia, J.
Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.
Versus
Molar Mal, Timber Merchant, Through L.Rs.
Civil Revision No. 1855 of 1994,
Decided On : MAY 26, 1998
HARYANA URBAN (CONTROL OF RENT AND EVICTION) ACT, 1973 - SECTION 13 - EVICTION - PERSONAL NECESSITY - LANDLORD'S NEED FOR BUSINESS EXTENSION AND STORAGE OF RAW MATERIALS - INTERPRETATION OF 'SAME PURPOSE' - SUFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE PREMISES.
Fact of the Case:
Landlord sought eviction of tenant from rented land under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, claiming personal necessity for business extension and storage of raw materials. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction, but the Appellate Authority reversed the decision, holding that the landlord had not established a genuine need and had obtained alternative premises during the pendency of the eviction application.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the landlord had sufficiently pleaded the need for the demised premises for business purposes and that the Appellate Authority had erred in interpreting 'same purpose' to mean the same business. The Court also found that the landlord's need was genuine and that the alternative premises were not sufficient or suitable for the landlord's business.
Issues: 1. Whether the landlord had sufficiently pleaded the need for the demised premises for business purposes? 2. Whether the Appellate Authority had erred in interpreting 'same purpose' to mean the same business? 3. Whether the landlord's need was genuine? 4. Whether the alternative premises were sufficient or suitable for the landlord's business?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the landlord had sufficiently pleaded the need for the demised premises for business purposes, as it was not necessary to specify the exact business to be carried out in the application. The details of the business could be provided in the replication, which is part of the pleadings. 2. The Court held that the Appellate Authority had erred in interpreting 'same purpose' to mean the same business. The Court found that 'same purpose' could only mean that the rented land could not be used for any other purpose than the business for which it was let out, but it did not mean the same business. 3. The Court found that the landlord's need was genuine, as the demised premises were adjacent to the landlord's factory and were required for business extension and storage of raw materials. 4. The Court found that the alternative premises were not sufficient or suitable for the landlord's business, as one of the premises had buildings let out to a tent store and the other premises were not adjacent to the factory.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority, and restored the order of the Rent Controller, ordering the tenant to be ejected from the demised premises.
R.S.Mongia, J.
1. M/s. Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. (Petitioner), instituted eviction application against the respondent Molar Mal under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 from rented land on the ground that the same was required for personal necessity of the petitioner. It was averred that the landlord was not occupying any other rented land for the purpose of business in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar, nor he has vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of Rent Act.
2. The tenant contested the Eviction Application inter-alia on the ground that the demised premises were not residential building. The same could not be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity. The demised premises consisted of a room with a varandah and courtyard with two tin sheds and a passage situated appurtenant thereto. The demised premises according to the tenant were covered under the definition of building as given in the act and the same was not rented land. The allegation of personal necessity was denied. It was further averred in the amended written statement that during the pendency of the ejectment application, the landlord had got possession of area about 18 x 45 from Atma Ram Jassa Ram; 16 x 40 from Sakuja Trunk Houses; and 10 x 40 from Sh. Kehar Singh and under these circumstances, the need of the landlord had been sufficiently met and there was no need to get the premises in dispute vacated for personal necessity.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller :-
1) Whether the applicant company is a private limited company and whether Ram Avtar is competent to file the present application for ejectment? OPA.
2) Whether the property in dispute is a rented land and is if so its effect? OPA.
3) If issue No. 2 is proved in the affirmative whether the applicant company, requires the premises in dispute for its bonafide use and occupation? OPA.
4) Whether the suit land is a non-residential building and as such the ground of ejectment for personal use is not available to the applicant ? OPR
5) Relief.
4-A) Whether the personal necessity of the applicant satisfied during the pendency of the present petition? OPR.
4. Vide order dated June 04, 1988, the learned Rent Controller decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the petitioner and on Issue No. 2 and 4, which were dealt together, findings were recorded, after discussing the entire oral and documentary evidence, that the premises in dispute was rented vacant land and not non-residential building. On issue No. 3 finding was recorded in favour of the petitioner for bonafide use and occupation. On issue No. 4-A it was held that the need of the applicant by getting the other property vacated had not been satisfied and the petitioner was entitled to get the respondent ejected from the demised premises.
5. Aggrieved by the order of ejectment by the learned Rent Controller, the respondent-tenant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Vide judgment of the Appellate Authority dated February 14, 1992, the impugned order of the learned Rent Controller was set aside and the case was sent back to the learned Rent Controller to re-decide Issue Nos. 3 and 4-A in the light of the observations made by the Appellate Authority. Against the judgment of the Appellate Authority the present petitioner (landlord) filed a revision petition in this Court, which vide order dated July 23, 1992, was allowed and the impugned order of the Appellate Authority was set aside with a direction to the Appellate Authority to rehear the appeal. Con- troversy again arose-whether the appeal was to be heard afresh on all the issues or only on Issue Nos.3 and 4-A. The Appellate Authority decided vide order dated April 27, 1993 that the appeal would be heard on all the issues. The landlord again brought the matter before this Court in a revision petition and vide order dated September 14, 1993, this court allow
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