The vesting of land in an occupancy tenant under the Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953, extinguished the landlord's rights and converted the occupancy rights into ownership rights, thereby conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the civil court to determine questions of ownership or title to the land.

Harjit Singh Bedi, J.

1. This judgment wilt dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 175 and 4271 of 1980, as common question of law and fact are involved in both the writ petitions. The facts have been taken from Civil Writ Petition No. 4271 of 1980

2. Respondent Nos. 5 to 14 filed a suit under Section 77(3) (d) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafter called the Act) to establish their claim to occupancy rights of land measuring 46 kanals 5 mar las, situated in village Wazirpur, Tehsil Ballabgarh. Respondent No. 4, vide order dated 6th August, 1973 annexure P-l to the petition, decreed the suit. The appeal and the revision filed by the petitioner were thereafter dismissed vide orders dated 6th May, 1976, 16th February, 1976 annexures P-2 and P-3, respectively by the order annexure P-l to P-3, the petitioner thereafter tiled a revision petition before the financial Commissioner, Haryana, who also dismissed the same vide order dated 16th July, 1980, Annexure P-4 with the petition. The petitioner has impugned the orders Annexure P-l to P-4 primarily on the ground that by virtue of Section 3 of the Punjab Occupancy Tenant (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Vesting Act), the property in question came to vest in the petitioner and the revenue Courts had, therefore, no jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 77(3) (d) of the Act. It has been urged that in view of this development it was a Civil Court alone which had the jurisdiction to determine the rights between the petitioner and respondent Nos. 5 to 14 inter se.

3. On behalf of the respondents, it has been argued by Mr. Mani Subrat Jain, learned Senior counsel, that the automatic vesting, as envisa ed by Section 3 of the Vesting Act, could be only with regard to those tenant/who had been recorded as occupancy tenants in the revenue records on 15th day of June, 1952, but with respect to those who were not so recorded on that date, the requisite enquiry would have to be made by the revenue courts alone. He has brought to my notice Sections 4 and 5 of the Vesting Act in order to contend that even after the vesting of the land in the occupancy tenant, the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities is not entirely barred as the question of compensation, which is to be paid to the former landowner in terms of the aforesaid Sections, has to be determined by the Collector. He has also urged that looking to the plaint filled by the respondents before the authorities under the Act, it was clear that they were seeking only a declaration with regard to their title as occupancy tenants and were not claiming ownership of the land in dispute The last argument urged by Mr M. S. Jain is that in any case once the revenue court had decided the matter after considering the evidence produced before it, and no prejudice could be said to have been suffered by the petitioner, this Court would not interfere by virtue of Section 100 sub-Section (3) of the Act.

4. I have considered the arguments raised by the counsel for the parties and am of the view that there is merit in the petitions and, as such, these are liable to be allowed.

5. The decision of the case would obviously hinge upon the statutory provisions. Section 77(3) (d) of the Act provides that a suit by a tenant to establish a claim to a right of occupancy, or by a landlord to prove that a tenant has not such a right ; shall be instituted in, and heard and determined by Revenue Courts and no other Court. It is significant that what is to be seen by the Revenue Courts in a suit filed before it is. whether a tenant claims a right of occupancy and not a right of ownership as such. Section 3(a) of the Vesting Act, which is relevant, is reproduced hereunder :

"3. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom or usage for the time being in force, on and from the appointed day- (a) all rights, title and interest (including the contingent interest, if any, recognized by any law, custom or u