The standard of proof required for framing a charge under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a prima facie case, which is made out where the evidence of the witnesses is entitled to a reasonable degree of credit and where there is a strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged.

A.P.Chowdhri, J.

1. Facts necessary for the disposal of these two Crl. Misc. Nos. 2467-M and 2468-M of 1987 are as follows :

There is a firm called M/s Emerson Paul Plastic Company with Sat Paul Singh Alang and Smt. Kaushalya Wati as partners dealing in electric and automobile components at Faridabad. The firm was assessed to income-tax and, for the assessment year 1976-77, return of income was filed by the firm on September 1, 1987, duly signed and verified by Sat Paul Singh Alang. Along with the return, the firm filed balance-sheet, profit and loss account and lists of sundry creditors and sundry debtors. The said copies of accounts were duly signed by the aforesaid partner. Assessment was completed on March 21, 1977, and total income computed was Rs. 35,130. Later on, it came to the knowledge of the Department that the assessee had furnished different figures for the sale, purchase, net profit, gross profit, capital, sundry creditors, etc., to the State Bank of India, Faridabad. Copies of accounts submitted to the State Bank of India were at variance with the copies of accounts submitted to the Department along with the return. After obtaining proper sanction, a complaint for offence under Section 276C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, "the Act"), was filed by the Income-tax Officer, B-Ward, Faridabad, against the firm and both partners in the court of JMIC, Faridabad.

2. A similar complaint was filed in the court of JMIC, Faridabad, relating to the subsequent period. In that case also, it was alleged that the accounts filed with the return were at variance with the accounts filed with the State Bank of India and the firm and the partners had committed an offence under Section 276C of the Act.

3. On behalf of the complainant, Shri K.C. Arora, Income-tax Officer, who had signed the complaint, appeared as PW-1 and examined Shri K. K. Arora, Field Officer of the State Bank of India, Faridabad, as PW-2. Besides, Shri R. P. Dhanda, Inspector, Income-tax Department, appeared as PW-3. The documents purported to have been submitted by Sat Paul Singh Alang to the State Bank of India which had been impounded and copies obtained were produced.

4. By order dated August 11, 1985, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, held that the evidence led by the prosecution was not sufficient in the sense that if the same was unrebutted, it would not warrant conviction of the accused. The complaint was, accordingly, dismissed. Revision filed against the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad, by order dated November 18, 1986. The present petitions have been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the orders of the courts below in exercise of the inherent powers of this court.

5. Shri Lakhminder Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, has taken a preliminary objection that the petitioner having availed of the revision before the Court of Session, further revision filed by it, though described as a petition under Section 482, was barred in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He placed reliance on Charanjit Singh v. Gursharan Kaur [1990] Crl. LJ 1264 (P & H) ; [1991] 99 PLR 388.

6. The preliminary objection does not present any serious difficulty as far as the present case is concerned. After reviewing the case law, learned judges of the Division Bench summed up the legal position in the following words ([1991] 99 PLR 388, 393) :

"The legal position that thus emerges is that the provisions of Section 397 of the Code do not constitute or operate as a bar to the exercise by the High Court of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. The limitation here, as observed in Raj Kapoors case [1980] Crl. LJ 202 ; AIR 1980 SC 258, is self-restraint and no more. It must, of course, be observed that where an order is amenable to revision, the order of the revisional court should be interfer