An application under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, is to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in Section 18-A of the Act, even if leave to contest is granted to the tenant.

I.S.Tiwana, J.

1. The order of Rent Controller, Chandigarh, dated 18th September, 1990, impuged herein not only appears to be unusual but illegal also. However, it purports to have been passed in the light of the Supreme Court order dated 11th January, 1990, in Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1990 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 236 of 1990. The following undisputed facts furnish the necessary backdrop of the case.

2. The petitioner, as a specified landlord, filed an application under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 , as applicable to Chandigarh, and hereinafter referred to as the Act, to seek eviction of the respondent on the ground that the accommodation in his possession in the local area was not suitable. He duly supported it with his affidavit. The controvert this stand of his, the respondent-tenant filed an affidavit in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 18-A of he Act, requesting leave of the Court to contest the said application. The same was, however, refused by the Court vide its order dated 26th August, 1988. Respondents revision petition against this order was again dismissed by this Court on 20th December, 1989 He preferred a Special Leave Petition, referred to above, which was allowed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following terms :-

"Special Leave granted. Having heard counsel for both the sides and also perused the material, we are of the opinion that this is a case where the Court below ought not to have refused leave to contest. The landlord is occupying the ground floor besides the entire second floor. The tenant is occupying the first floor. 1 h© question is whether the landlord requires the first floor also This question, in our opinion, could be properly determined only by granting leave to the tenant to contest. There is no need to take a summary procedure since it is a case of additional accommodation. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned orders and grant the tenant leave to contest the proceedings The; Controller shall now proceed according to law. Parties shall appear the Controller on 12 2-1990 to receive further direction. It is needless to state that all the other points are left open."

Now in the light of this order the Rent Controller has expressed the opinion that since the leave to contest has been allowed to the respondent in terms of Section 18-A of the Act, the proceedings in this petition under Section 13-A "are to be conducted as it is an ordinary petition under Section 13 of the Rent Act and the Court is not to follow the procedure as laid down under Section 18-A of the Rent Act." It is this order of the Rent Controller which is impugned in this petition. The order on the fact it. is against the mandate of the opening words of Section 18 A which lays down that "every application under Section 13-A shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section." This mandate is further reinforced by the next following section i.e. 18-B which reads :-

"Section 18 A or any rule made for |he purpose thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being inforce."

Therefore, the order dessrves to be set aside summarily on this score alone.

What however impressed the Rent Controller in expressing the above noted opinion is the following sentence occurring in the Supreme Court order : "There is no need to take a summary procedure since it is a case of additional accommodation "

To me it appears that the Controller has completely mis-interpreted the order of the Supreme Court and has read the above quoted sentence out of context. It is beyond dispute that the matter before the Supreme Court was only with regard to the grant of leave to the respondent to contest the proceedings launched by the petitioner under Section 13-A of the Act. In case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the view that the procedure under