The offence under Section 406, IPC, is a continuing offence and delay in filing a complaint can be condoned under Section 473, CrPC. Specific allegations of entrustment of dowry articles are necessary to sustain a charge under Section 406, IPC, against relatives of the husband.

1. The facts necessary for the disposal of the present petition under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing FIR No.28 dated 1-6-1989, Police Station Ambala under Sections 498-A and 406, I. P. C. are as follows :

2. Smt. Kiran Bala, respondent No.2 was married to Vishwa Mitter, petitioner No.1 on 14-7-1983. The parties to the marriage have been living separately from each other since 24-3-1985. Smt. Kiran Bala filed a complaint under Sections 498-A and 406, I. P. C. , dated 27-5-89 against her husband, petitioner No.1 and certain relations of the husband, who are petitioners Nos.2 to 4. These are her mother-in-law Smt. Ram Lubhai, petitioner No.4 her sister-in-law i. e. sister of her husband, Smt. Tarlochan Kumari, petitioner No.3 and Rakesh Kumar Verma husband of her sister-in-law Trilochan Kumari, petitioner No.2. The complaint was sent to the police by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala under Sec.156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police entered FIR Annexure P-1. The accused named in the FIR have filed this petition for quashing, the same. It may also be mentioned that the wife instituted an application under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 19-5-1986. In that application, she made a statement dated 13-6-1987 (Annexure P-3) on 23-7-1986, the husband caused a notice to be sent through his lawyer asking the wife to collect items of dowry lying at his house. No reply was received to that notice. On 13-3-1989, the husband instituted an application for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the husband made an application Annexure P-5 on 9-5-1989 for a direction that the wife should remove articles of dowry lying at his house.

3. No reply was filed to the petitioner by the private respondent No.2.

4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the FIR against petitioner Nos.2 to 4 deserves to be quashed as an abuse of the process of the Court. There is, however, no case for quashing the FIR against petitioner No.1.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the complaint which was the basis for the present FIR was barred by limitation of three years laid down in Sec.468 (2) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was pointed out that in the complaint, no date was mentioned when the accused allegedly declined to restore possession of the dowry articles to respondent No.2. In the absence of any such specification, it was submitted, the only inference was that the accused declined to restore possession of those articles on 24-4-1985 when the parties last resided together. Counting the limitation from that date the complaint dated 27-5-1989 was beyond three years and thus barred under the provisions mentioned above. A perusal of the FIR Annexure P-1 in which the complaint has been reproduced shows that in paragraph 4, it was stated that the complainant was finally turned out of the house on 24-4-1985 and despite best efforts by the brotherhood till the end of 1987, no fruitful result had come out and the accused persons refused to rehabilitate the complainant in her matrimonial home and also refused to deliver the articles of dowry. In other words, it was averred in paragraph 4 that the accused refused to deliver the dowry articles towards the end of year 1987. The complaint, in the facts of the case, was thus filed within the period of limitation laid down in Sec.468 of the Code. Moreover, I have had an occasion to examine this question in detail in Criminal Misc. No.5686-M of 87 decided on August 10, 1989 and for the reasons mentioned therein, the offence under Sec.406, I P. C. is a continuing offence within the meaning of Sec.472. In any case, it is necessary in the interest of justice to condone the delay assuming that there was delay in the case, in exercise of the powers under Sec.473 of the Code. The first contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, rejected.

6. Learne