The meaning of "residential house" in Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the provision, which is to protect debtors from losing their homes.

Tek Chand, J.

1. Execution First Appeal No; 151 of 1956 was presented in this Court by Firm Ganga Ram Kishore Chand Judgment-debtor-appellants against firm Jai Ram Bhagat Ram decree-holders. The decree-holders had obtained a decree for recovery of Rs. 6,830.

2. The other appeal Execution First Appeal No. 206 of 1956 was presented in the Court of the District Judge, Ferozepore, from which Court, it has been transferred to this Court In this case a decree was passed in favour of Nauharia Ma! respondent for a sum of Rs. 2,707/ on the 12th January, 1955. As the judgment-debtor in both execution first appeals is the same, and the property under attachment is identical, the two appeals can be conveniently disposed of by the same judgment. The house under attachment is a three storeyed building situated in Moga Mandi. The two upper storeys are admittedly used for residential purposes, and are in the occupation of judgment-debtors and the members of their families. As regards the purpose, to which the ground floor is put, there is a conflict between the respective versions of the parties. The judgment-debtors-appellants maintained, that after the failure of their business several years ago, the ground floor ceased to be used as a shop and the rooms behind were not used as store rooms. After 1948, the judgment-debtors contend, that even the portion that was at one time being used as shop, was occupied for residential purposes.

3. The judgment-debtors have raised ob-jections to the attachment of this property in execution of the respective decrees on the principal ground that under provisions of Section 60(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure; as applicable to Punjab, one main residential house and other buildings attached to it belonging to a judgment-debtor other than an agriculturist and occupied by him are not liable to attachment or sale in execution of a decree.

4. The decree-holders deny the allegations of the judgment-debtors and contend that the house in question cannot be deemed to be residential, house. The decree-holders maintain that the whole of the first floor was being used as a shop and the principal purpose of these buildings was essentially commercial and not residential. Moreover, the building is situated in Moga market, a locality exclusively intended for transacting business.

5. The execution Court framed the follow-ing issues :-

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1. Whether the property in dispute is not liable to attachment as alleged?

2. Whether the judgment-debtors are estopped from raising these objections?

3. Relief.

As there was no evidence led in support of issue No. 2 it was decided against the decree-holders. The main controversy is with regard to the first issue. The executing Court dismissed the objection and came fa the conclusion that the whole of the ground floor had always been used for the purpose of business and the residence was confined to the upper storey and the residential purpose was subservient to the main purpose which was the commercial use of the building.

6. Learned counsel have taken me through the evidence in this case and after perusal of the same, I cannot be persuaded to hold that the ground-floor was being used after 1948 exclusively for residential purposes. The judgment-debtors maintained, that they, and the members of their family, are thirty in all, who are dwelling in this house. . Such business as was carried on, after they met with financial set back in 1948, was on the open site in front of the house. It was also argued, that they used to sell ice during summer but the ice used to be sold in the open. I cannot believe that when they had accommodation on the ground-floor, they, would have been selling ice in the open during summer allowing it to quickly melt in the heat.

There is sufficient material on the record to show that on the failure of judgment-debtors firm, the business was carried on in the names of the sons and other members of the family. No evidence has been led by the judgment-debto