The doctrine of res judicata does not apply where there is only one trial and one judgment, even though two decrees are passed.

Tek Chand, J.

1. This is a regular second appeal against the decree and judgment of the Senior Sub Judge, Rohtak, allowing the appeal of one Shrimati Munni respondent and setting aside the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Jhajjar, in favour of Umrao Singh. This appeal arises out of a contest between two competing pre-emptors. The facts of this case so far as they are relevant for purposes of this appeal are that on 21st of August, 1953, one Manohar Lal Mahajan of Jhajjar for himself and as attorney of his brothers, defendants Nos. 8 to 11, had sold the lend by a registered sale-deed for Rs. 7,500/. This gave rise to two pre-emption suits. Umrao Singh plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit, No. 222 of 1954, on 7th of June 1954, for possession of the property in suit by pre-emption on the ground that he was a co-sharer in the khata in which the land in suit was situated. Besides the vendors and the vendees, one Shrimati Munni, the contesting respondent before me, was also impleaded as defendant No. 12. This lady is the mother of the vendors. The second suit, No. 270 of 1954, was brought by Shrimati Munni as the rival pre-emptor claiming possession by way of pre-emption under section 15 (b) thirdly, of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as the heir of the vendors. She also asserted her right of pre-emption on the ground that she was a biswedar. The following issues were framed :

1. Whether the plaintiffs or the rival pre-emptor have a preferable right of pre-emption qua the vendees?

2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs or the rival pre-emptor have a preferential right of pre-emption, inter se?

3. Whether the sale price of Rs. 7500/- was paid or fixed in good faith?

4. If issue No. 3 is not proved what is the market value of the property in suit?

5. Relief?

The trial Court by its order dated 8th October, 1954, consolidated the two suits which were disposed of by one judgment but two decrees were passed in them. In Civil Suit No. 222 of 1954 in which Umrao Singh was the plaintiff the trial Court passed a decree for possession by preemption of the land in suit in his favour against the defendants on payment of Rs. 7,500/- by 18th February, 1955. In case of default in payment of the above amount by the due date the plaintiffs suit was to stand dismissed with costs. The amount was paid by due date and all the terms of the decree were complied with in terms of Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Suit No. 270 of 1954, instituted by Shrimati Munni, was also decreed but it was proved that that decree would not take effect until Umrao Singh the rival pre-emptor failed to exercise his right of pre-emption under the decree passed in his favour in the previously instituted suit. Shrimati Munni did not file any appeal from the decree passed in suit No. 222 of 1954 in favour of Umrao Singh, but she presented an appeal from the decree passed tn suit No. 270 of 1954 which had been instituted by her. Her contention was that her right to preempt the sale was preferential as compared to the right of Umrao Singh, the rival pre-emptor. She asserted her right of pre-emption in respect of the property in question under section 15 (b) thirdly, and Umrao Singh claimed his right of pre-emption under section 15 (b), fourthly, as a co-sharer. The dispute requiring decision on merits Was in regard to the second issue. The lower appellate Court on issue No. 2 held that Shrimati Munni as the mother of the vendors was an heir under the Hindu Law by which the parties were governed and as such she was held to have a preferential right to pre-empt as against Umrao Singh who merely claimed as a co-sharer.

2. A preliminary objection was taken before the lower appellate Court by Umrao Singh. He contended that as there were two separate decrees in respect of the land in suit, one in his favour, and another in favour of Shrimati Munni, she should have filed two separate appeals against two separate decrees notwithstanding that