The period of limitation fixed by Section 11 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 applies only to applications filed by landlord or tenant simply for purpose of determining standard rent and not when matter is raised in course of any suit or proceedings.

Falshaw, J.

1. The circumstances giving rise to this revision petition are as follows. The respondent Madan Lal Jain was a tenant of the petitioner Manohar Lal Jain in certain premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. The latter instituted al suit for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he had not paid the rent for the months of March and April 1953 amounting to Rs. 150/-. He did not, however, add any claim for the recovery of the sum due as arrears. At an early stage before filing his written statement, though not actually on his first appearance in the suit, the defendant deposited in Court the sum of Rs. 150/- together with costs. In his written statement he contended that the rent of the premises was excessive and asked the Court to fix the standard rent and also claimed that he was entitled to be credited for a sum of Rs. 50/- which he had spent on repairs.

2. The trial Court framed the issues :

1.Whether the defendant has deposited the arrears of rent and costs due within the time allowed by the Court? If so, how does it affect the suit?

2.Whether the defendant is liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent?

3.What is the standard rent?

4.Whether the defendant has done repairs? If so, what, and whether he is entitled to charge the same from the plaintiff without payment of court-fee?

3. At a subsequent stage the plaintiff challenged the framing of issues 3 and 4 and applied for them to be deleted. The trial Court took the view that since the suit was one simply for ejectment and the tenant had saved himself from liability to a decree for ejectment by depositing the arrears of rent due together with costs within the time allowed, all that was necessary was to dismiss the plaintiffs suit and that the issues relating to standard rent and money spent on repairs should be considered as deleted. The plaintiffs suit was accordingly dismissed, but he was allowed his costs out of the amount deposited for this purpose in the Court.

4. The plaintiff accepted this decision and did not file any appeal, but an appeal was filed by the tenant who claimed that the issues regarding standard rent and set-off on account of repairs should not have been deleted by the trial Court, and that he was entitled to a decision thereon. A preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff regarding court-fee paid by the defendant on his appeal was dealt with by the learned Senior Sub-Judge by his order of 12-1-1955 by which he allowed the deficiency in court-fee to be made good, and, then by his order dated the 14th of January, he accepted the defendants appeal and remanded the case for decision by the trial Court on the deleted issue subject to the payment of court-fee by the defendant on the amount claimed by was of set-off.

5. In filing a revision petition against this order, the landlord also applied that in case it is found that the order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge was an original order, the petition should be treated as an appeal from that order. I do not, however, think that this point arises since it seems to me that the order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge is clearly revisable under the provisions of Section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.

6. Although the order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, dated 12-1-1955, holding that the court-fee paid by the defendant in tots appeal was insufficient and allowing him time to make good the deficiency has been challenged In the grounds, the petitioners objections in this respect have not been pressed and his main grievance is concerned With the order of the lower appellate Court directing the trial Court to enquire into the matter and fix the standard rent of the premises.

7. Section 8 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1952 fixes the cases in which the standard rent may be fixed by the Court. It is not in dispute that the premises are fairly recently constructed and were let for the first time after 2-6-1944. The relevant portion of Section 8 r