Harnam Singh, J.

1. These are two appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of Falshaw J., given on 14-9-1948 in appeals preferred by the Governor General in Council against orders of a Subordinate Judge at Delhi making two awards rules of the Court and passing decrees in accordance therewith.

2. A preliminary point has been taken that these appeals are not competent. The argument is based upon Clause (2) of Section 39, Arbitration Act. Clause (1) provides that an appeal shall lie from certain orders passed under the Act. There is no dispute that the appeals before the learned single Judge were competent. Clause (2), Section 39, is as follows :

"(2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court."

3. It is claimed that although these are appeals under the Letters Patent, they are nevertheless second appeals and therefore are not competent. This point had arisen before in the Lahore High Court in -- Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi V/s. Jassa Ram Hira Nand, reported in AIR 1948 Lah 84 (A) when a Bench of that Court held that an appeal of the same nature as the present is competent. The opinion expressed by Mahajan J., was in these words :

"The expression second appeal has seldom been used in respect to appeals which arise within this Court and which are very commonly described as inter-Court appeals. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Sub-section (2) of section 39 does not take away the right that has been conferred on a litigant under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of tnis Court. It seems to me that this sub-section only refers to two kinds of appeals that are mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure, namely those a right to which is conferred by Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, and those the right to which is given by Sections 109 and 110 of the Code."

This view, however, has not been followed by other High Courts. The most recent pronouncement is of the Bombay High Court in --Madhavdas Devidas V/s. Vithaldas Vasudeodas, reported in AIR 1952 Bom 229 (B). The learned Judges there referred to the decision in -- Harmman Chamber of Commerce V/s. Jassa Ram (A), which was followed by this High Court in -- Banwari Lal V/s. Hindu College, Delhi, AIR 1949 EP 165 (C), and expressly dissented from that opinion. The learned Judges also referred to the view expressed by the Madras High Court in --Radhakrishnamurthy V/s. Ethirajulu Chetty and Co., AIR 1945 Mad 184 (D) also contrary to that given in -- Hanuman Chamber of Commerce (A) and -- Banwari Lals cases (C). It is very desirable that there should be a concurrence of judicial opinion on an important point such as this. I do not mean to say that this High Court must follow other High Courts opinion against its conscience, but in the present state of the authorites, I think it is proper that the question should be re-examined by this Court and finally decided and I consider, therefore, that this matter should go to a Full Bench.

4. The decision seems to turn upon whether the expression "second appeal" appearing in Section 39(2), Arbitration Act, is to be given a technical meaning as an appeal covered by Section 100, Civil P. C. I myself do not understand the necessity for giving to the expression "second appeal" such technical meaning. The words "second appeal" do not in fact appear in Section 100 at all although they form a marginal note to the section. The words "second appeal" do appear in S, 101 and certain following sections. There can be no doubt that the Letters Patent of this High Court is to be regarded as general law as contrasted with the special law of Section 39, Arbitration Act, and the general right of appeal given by Clause 10, Letters Patent, must give way if by Section 39 it is provided that no such appeal lies. The purpose of Section 39 is very obvious. It is consistent with the general scheme of the Ar