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1952 Supreme(P&H) 66

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
D.Falshaw and Kapur JJ.
Mahabir Parshad
Versus
Commr.Of Income Tax
Civil Writ No. 310 of 1951,
Decided On : JULY 17, 1952

The period of limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act begins from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and not from the date of communication of the order to the assessee.

Headnote:

INCOME TAX - LIMITATION - REVISION PETITION - DATE OF ORDER - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 33A(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT - WHETHER LIMITATION BEGINS FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER OR FROM THE DATE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE ORDER TO THE ASSESSEE.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner filed a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act, more than one year after the date of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but within one year from the date of receipt of the order. The Commissioner dismissed the petition as barred by time.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the period of limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act begins from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and not from the date of communication of the order to the assessee.

Issues: Whether the period of limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act begins from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or from the date of communication of the order to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the plain words of Section 33A(2) of the Income Tax Act, which states that the revision petition must be filed "within one year from the date of the order," to mean that the period of limitation begins from the date of the order and not from the date of communication of the order to the assessee. The court also considered various other sections of the Act and found that the distinction between the various sections in the Act must be taken to be intentional.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and discharged the rule, holding that the revision petition was barred by time.

Judgment

Kapur, J.

1. Counsel moves for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus against the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab in regard to an order passed on the 6th June 1948.

2. The facts of this case are that in regard to an assessment order for the year 1944-45 a penalty of Rs. 1,200/- was imposed on the petitioner under Section 28 of the Income-tax Act which on appeal to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner was reduced to Rs. 900/-, but it appears that the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner Punjab was received by the petitioner after the 27th November 1946: what exact date it was is not stated in the petition. Under Section 33-A(2) of the Income-tax Act the petitioner filed a revision petition on the 26th November 1947. On the 6th June 1948 the Commissioner dismissed the petition as being barred by time. On the 25th June 1948 the petitioner filed an application for review against the above order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act. The petitioner alleges that no order was passed on this application, and that on the 8th April 1951 he made another application stating that his previous application dated the 24th June had been mislaid. He referred in his new application to a judgment of the Madras High Court which has since been reported as -- Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras, AIR 1951 Mart 204. in which the question of limitation was decided and prayed that his revision petition be restored and he be given a personal hearing. On the 22nd September 1951 this application was dismissed on the ground that the previous order was correct. He has now come up with an application for a writ of mandamus.

3. The order in regard to which he wishes a writ to issue is dated the 6th June 1948, and our power of issuing writs was conferred by the Constitution which came into force on the 26th January 1950. It has been held in -- Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, 1951 S. C. R. 228, that the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitution have no retrospective effect and therefore it cannot affect an act which was done before the commencement of the Constitution. As the Constitution became operative only on and from the 26th January 1950 the powers conferred under Article 226 cannot affect orders which had already been passed, nor would this Court have the power to interfere with such orders. This view is consistent with the view taken by a large number of other High Courts.

4. As the question of costs may arise I think it necessary to give a finding on the merits of the ca.se also. According to Section 33-A of the Income-tax Act the Commissioner may by his own motion call for the record of any proceedings and may pass such orders as he thinks fit not being prejudicial to the assessee, and according to the proviso he cannot revise any such order if "(c) the order has been made more than one year previously". The petitioner relies upon Section 33-A(2) which is in the following terms:

"(2) The Commissioner may. on application by an assessee for revision of an order under this Act passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, made within one year from the date of the order, call for the record of the proceeding in which such order was passed, and on receipt of the record may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made, and, subject to the provisions of this Act, may pass such order thereon, not being an order prejudicial to the assessee, as he thinks fit."

The submission of the petitioners counsel is that the words in this sub-section "made within one year from the date of the order" mean not merely within one year from the date of the order but within one year from the date when the petitioner is notified of that order, and he relies on the judgment of the Madras High Court which I have referred to above, namely, -- Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 204.

5. In order to determine the meaning of these words it may be necessary to refer to some of the other




















































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