The period of limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act begins from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and not from the date of communication of the order to the assessee.

KAPUR, J.

1. Counsel moves for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus against the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, in regard to an order passed on the June 6, 1948.

2. The facts of this case are that in regard to an assessment order for the year 1944-45 a penalty of Rs. 1,200 was imposed on the petitioner under Section 28 of the Income-tax Act which on appeal to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner was reduced to Rs. 900, but it appears that the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, was received by the petitioner after the the November 27, 1946; what exact date it was is not stated in the petition. Under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act the petitioner filed a revision petition on the November 26, 1947. On the June 6, 1948, the Commissioner dismissed the petition as being barred by time. On the June 24, 1948, the petitioner filed an application for review against the above order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act. The petitioner alleges that on order was passed on this application, and that on the April 8, 1951, he made another application stating that his previous application dated the June 24, had been mislaid. He referred in this new application to a judgment of the Madras High Court which has since been reported as Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, in which the question of limitation was decided and prayed that his revision petition be restored and he be given a personal hearing. On the September 22, 1951, this application was dismissed on the ground that the previous order was correct. He has now come up with an application for a writ of mandamus.

3. The order in regard to which he wishes a writ to issue is dated the June 6, 1948, and our power of issuing writs was conferred by the Constitution which came into force on the January 26, 1950. It has been held in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, that the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitution have no restrospective effect and therefore it cannot affect an act which was done before operative only on and from the January 26, 1950, the powers conferred under Article 226 cannot affect orders which had already been passed, nor would this Court have the power to interfere with such orders. This view is consistent with the view taken by a large number of other High Courts.

4. As the question of costs may arise I think it necessary to give a finding on the merits of the case also. According to Section 33A of the Income-tax Act the Commissioner may on his own motion call for the record of any proceedings and may pass such orders as he thinks fit not being prejudicial to the assessee, and according to the proviso he cannot revise any such order if "(c) the order has been made more than one year previously". The petitioner relies upon Section 33A(2) which is in the following terms :-

"(2) The Commissioner may, on application by an assessee for revision of an order under this Act passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, made within one year from the date of the order, call for the record of the proceeding in which such was passed and on receipt of the record may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made, and, subject to the provisions of this Act may pass such order thereon, not being an order prejudicial to the assessee, as he thinks fit."

5. The submission of the petitioners counsel is that the words in this sub-section "made within one year from the date of the order" mean not merely within one year from the date of the order but within one year from the date when the petitioner is notified of that order, and he relies on the judgment of the Madras High Court which I have referred to above, namely Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras.

6. In order to determine the meaning of these words it may be necessary to refer to some of the order section of the Act. Section 31(5) of the Act provides :-

"31. (5) The Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall, on the co