IMPORTANT POINT
Taking of Cognizance—Limitation of—Identity of the petitioner was revealed only on the completion of investigation—Date of filing the challan is only relevant for the purpose of limitation.

Ranjit Singh, J. :- Invoking the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has sought quashing of FIR No. 146/2003 dated 8.4.2003 registered under Sections 279/337 IPC at Police Station, Dhandar Kalan, Focal Point, Ludhiana. The petitioner claims that the present case cannot be proceeded against him in view of the limitation laid down under Section 468 Cr.P.C, as the charge-sheet in this case has been filed after expiry of period of one year and thus would bar the taking of cognizance of the offence against him by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana.

2. FIR was registered on 8.4.2003 within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Dhandar Kalan, Focal Point Ludhiana under Sections 279/337 IPC in connection with an accident, which took place on 7.4.2003. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 9.8.2004. On 18.10.2004 charges were framed against the petitioner. On 30.04.2005, the petitioner moved an application for recalling of the summoning order against him on the ground that the challan had been filed after the period of limitation and as such the cognizance had been taken on the expiry of the period of limitation as provided under Section 468 Cr.P.C. This application, however, was rejected by the Magistrate on 3.9.2005 by relying on the case of Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharasthra & anr., 2005(1) Chandigarh Law Reporter page 10 by holding that Magistrate has no power to recall or review its own order and to discharge the accused. Thereafter the present petition was filed seeking quashing of the FIR and the proceedings on the grounds, as afore-mentioned.

3. On notice having been issued, the reply was filed. A preliminary objection was raised in regard to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioner would have an equally efficacious remedy to file a revision petition against the order dated 09.08.2004, whereby the charges were framed against the petitioner. On merits, it is contended that the petitioner never raised any objection in this regard at the time of framing of charge and hence he cannot be heard on this count now, specially so when he has filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. During the pendency of the case, the petitioner moved Crl. Misc. No 1083 of 2006 for placing on record notice dated 20.6.2003 issued to him under Section 160 Cr.P.C. and order dated 23.6.2003 passed by the High Court of Delhi.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties,

4. The counsel for the petitioner, while relying on the case State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, 1981 Crl. J.722, would submit that the object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which the material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of offence. He has also referred to Moti Pathak and others v. State of U.P., 1988 (2) Crimes page 659 to say that the plea of bar of limitation can be raised at any stage of proceedings. Even when it was not raised, the Magistrate should have considered his power and authority in the light of sections 468 and 473 Cr.P.C.

5. Section 468 Cr.P,C. creates a bar for taking cognizance of an offence after expiry of period of limitation and reads as:­

“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.-(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2)The period of limitation shall be­

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only:

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

(3) For the purposes of this sec