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2008 Supreme(P&H) 1635

2009 (1) RCR(Cri) 430
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
S. D. ANAND, J
Bhupinder Singh - Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab & others - Respondent
Criminal Misc. No.M-9219 of 2008
Decided on: 22.9.2008

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner:Mr. V.K. Jindal, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Ms. Manjari Nehru, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab.

The central legal point established in the judgment is that the categorization of offences as heinous, as per the Punjab Jail Manual instructions, must be based on the enumerated offences, and the competent authority cannot declare an offence as heinous beyond the definitive provisions.

Headnote:

Premature Release - Convict's Eligibility - Punjab Jail Manual, 1996 - Section 302 IPC - Para 431 - Offences under Section 302 - Offences under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Offences under Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 - Offences under Section 120-B of the IPC

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a convict serving a life sentence under Section 302 IPC, sought premature release based on the Punjab Jail Manual instructions. The respondents denied the release, citing the heinous nature of the petitioner's crime, involving a bomb blast in a temple.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioner's offence did not fall within the definition of heinous crimes as per the Punjab Jail Manual instructions, and the competent authority could not raise a plea that the petitioner had been convicted for a heinous offence based on the enumerated offences.

Issues: The main issue was the petitioner's eligibility for premature release under the Punjab Jail Manual instructions, specifically regarding the categorization of the offence as heinous.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the offence for which the petitioner was convicted could not be considered heinous based on the enumerated offences in the Punjab Jail Manual instructions, and directed the respondents to consider the premature release in light of the court's observations.

Final Decision: The petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and the respondents were directed to consider the premature release of the petitioner within one week.

JUDGMENT

S. D. ANAND, J

1. The petitioner, a lifer undergoing incarceration on account of his conviction under Section 302 IPC in case FIR No. 104 dated 9.7.1997, Police Station, Baghapurana, has filed the present petition for a direction to the respondents to grant him premature release in terms of instructions contained in para 431 of the Punjab Jail Manual, 1996 (Annexure P-3). The plea, raised in the context, is that the petitioner having undergone actual sentence for 10 years and total sentence of more than 14 years is entitled to be considered for premature release in the light of the above instructions, particularly when he has maintained a good conduct and did not commit any jail offence during the period of his incarceration. Further averment is that the denial of pre-mature release to the petitioner is violative of instructions Annexure P-3 and amounts to his wrongful confinement.

2. The respondents, by filing a counter, reiterated the correctness of the impugned denial by pointing out that the petitioner having been convicted for a heinous crime shall be eligible for premature release only after he has undergone actual sentence for a period of 12 years and 18 years of total sentence including remissions etc. Further averment in the context is that the petitioner had been convicted on a charge that he had caused a bomb blast in a temple in the area of Baghapurana.

3. It is common ground that the competent authority is ordained by instructions Annexure P-3 to consider the premature release cases of those undergoing incarceration in jails in the State of Punjab. The instructions have categrorised the convicts into five categories. Category (A) pertains to those convicts whose death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment; Category (B) pertains to the convicts who had been imprisoned for life for the offence for which the death is the punishment and the charge upheld against them is of a heinous crime; Category (C) pertains to the convicts who had been imprisoned for life for offences for which death is the penalty but crime proved against them is not considered as heinous; Category (D) pertains to other life convicts who had been imprisoned for life for offence for which the death penalty is not the provided punishment but who have committed a heinous crime; and Category (E) pertains to other life convicts.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the case of the petitioner is covered under Category ( C); whereas the State presentation is that it is Category (B) which is applicable to the petitioner because the charge proved against him was heinous in nature. In the face of the presentation on behalf of the State, learned counsel for the petitioner points out that the crime, for which the petitioner was convicted, does not fall within the definition of heinous crime which have been defined in Annexure P-3 itself. For enabling appropriate adjudication of the controversy, the definitive/enumeration clause recorded in Annexure P-3 itself, is reproduced as under:-

“A. Heinous crimes with reference to column 'B' of 1 (i) above are defined as follows:-

(i) Offence under Section 302 alongwith 347 of the IPC i.e. murder with wrongful confinement for extortion;

(ii) Section 302 with 375 i.e. murder with rape.

(iii) Offence of dacoity with murder.

(iv) Offence under Section 302 along with offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

(v) Offence under Section 302 alongwith offence under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955.

(vi) Offence under Section 302 where muder has been committed connection with any dispute over dowry and this is indicated in the judgment of the Trial Court.

(vii) Offence under Section 302 where the victim is a child under the age of 14 years.

(viii) Double murder and murder committed after conviction while inside the Jail or on parole or on expiry of sentence shall be treated as heinous crime.

(ix) Any conviction under Section 120-B of the IPC.”

5. It





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