The main legal point established is that when seeking the cancellation of a sale deed, the petitioner is required to pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration mentioned in the sale deed, as per relevant legal precedents.

RAM CHAND GUPTA, J. (Oral) - C.M.No.12102-CII of 2011

Application is allowed subject to all just exceptions.

The present revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside order dated 26.4.2011, Annexure P3, passed by learned trial Court, vide which petitioner-plaintiff has been directed to pay ad valorem court fee on the amount of consideration of sale deed.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the whole record carefully including the impugned order passed by learned trial Court.

3. Facts relevant for the decision of present revision petition are that petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction that he is owner and in possession of the property in dispute and that respondents-defendants by playing fraud upon him, got his signatures on some documents on the plea that agreement to sell was being executed and, however, later on he came to know that, in fact, sale deed was got executed and registered by them in their favour.

4. Though the suit has been filed for declaration that the sale deed dated 30.3.2011 is null, void and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiff, however, the relief sought by petitioner-plaintiff, in fact, is for getting the same set aside on the ground of fraud to which he is a party. Sale deed is a registered one.

5. Matter regarding Court fee has been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, 1982 PLR 127 by observing that the Court in deciding the question of court fee should look into the allegations made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for and that mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. It has been further observed that where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration, if any, is only a surplusage, the case would not be covered under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act and in that case main relief in the main suit is held to be cancellation of the sale-deed, the only provision applicable is Article 1, Schedule I of the Act. Relevant paragraphs of the same reads as under:-

“7. It is well settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court fee should look into the allegations made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case, the Court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Where the main relief is that of cancellation of the deed, and the declaration, if any, is only a surplusage, the case would not be covered under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act, because in a suit under that clause the main relief is that of a declaration and the consequential relief is just ancillary. In this respect, reference may again be made to Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case (supra), wherein it has been observed as follows:-

“It seems obvious that the consequential relief referred to in Section 7(iv)(c) could not mean a substantive relief, the valuation of which is separately provided for in the Court Fees Act. If it were so held, a plaintiff could easily evade payment of the necessary Court-fee on the substantive relief by prefacing it with a declaration as to his rights. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary to the grant of the relief claimed by him. But the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such rights cannot convert a suit for a substantive relief into one for a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c) Court-fees Act. It is significant that the valuation of the relief in cases falling within the scope of Section 7(iv)(c) is left to the plaintiff. This is presumably b