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2011 Supreme(P&H) 2145

2012 (3) RCR(Civ) 91
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
A.N. JINDAL, J
Jagtar Singh - Appellant
Vs.
Shingara Singh and another - Respondents
R.S.A. No. 1265 of 2009 (O&M)
Decided on: December 14, 2011

Advocates appeared:
Mr. S.C. Khunger, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. A.S. Jattana, Advocate for the respondents.

The main legal point established in the judgment is that common land reserved for the common purpose of the community, as defined under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, cannot be transferred to an individual and does not confer ownership or possession rights under the Transfer of Property Act.

Headnote:

Property Dispute - Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 - Section 2(g), Section 85 - The court discussed the disputed property's status as common land under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, and its vesting in the Gram Panchayat. It highlighted that the property, though used by the proprietors of the patti, was reserved for the common purpose of the community and therefore could not be transferred to the defendant. The court also emphasized that the defendant could not seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Fact of the Case:

The suit involved a property dispute regarding a plot used for common purposes by the inhabitants of a village. The defendant claimed ownership based on agreements and possession, while the plaintiffs argued that the property was common land.

Finding of the Court:

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. It held that the disputed property was not part of the defendant's house and was used as a common area by the village inhabitants. The court also found the suit maintainable in a representative capacity.

Issues: The issues included the entitlement to injunction, locus standi of the plaintiffs, and the maintainability of the suit in a representative capacity.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the disputed property, though used by the proprietors of the patti, was reserved for the common purpose of the community and therefore could not be transferred to the defendant. It also highlighted that the defendant could not seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, finding no perversity or illegality in the judgment.

JUDGMENT

A.N. Jindal, J

1. This is defendant's regular second appeal against the judgment dated 4.4.2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, whereby the appellate court while reversing the judgment dated 3.8.2006 passed by the trial court, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. This suit filed by the plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC against the defendant is regarding the property situated within the red line of village Kalsian. There is Aramgah situated in Turf Massandan (Patti Massandan) used for the common purpose. It has been pleaded that the suit property being “gair mumkin aramgah gair jari” by nature has also a room and a boundary wall which is located for the last 35 years. Since the inhabitants of the village Massandan including the plaintiffs had been using the property for the common purpose for holding meetings and resting, therefore, the defendant has no right to encroach upon the same. The house of the defendant abuts the property in dispute. Now the property is in dilapidated condition. On being threatened to encroach upon the said property, the plaintiffs had to file the suit.

2. On being notified, the defendant appeared and contested the cause. Besides some preliminary objections, it was also submitted by the defendant that the property was not left for the common purpose or common use by the inhabitants of Turf Massandan of village Kalsian, but the same has been sold by its owners namely Jagdev Singh and many others to him for a consideration of `33,750/-and `8500/-vide agreements dated 15.9.1997 and 17.9.1997 respectively. He had been delivered the possession of the same. Thus, he has become owner in possession of the same. In any case, he being in exclusive possession of the suit property is entitled to seek protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

3. From the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues :

1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to injunction as prayed for?OPP

2. Whether plaintiffs have got no locus standi to file the instant suit?OPP

3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the representative capacity?OPD

4. Relief.

4. Both the parties led evidence. The trial court, on perusal of the evidence decided the issues No.1 and 2 in favour of the defendant and issue No.3 was disposed of being not pressed by the defendants. Consequently, it dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, however, while reversing the findings on issues No.1 and 2, the first appellate court decreed the suit of the plaintiff, while concluding as under :

“...... I have come to the conclusion that disputed property is neither part of house of the defendant and nor in his possession, but Aramgah of inhabitants of turf massandan. As such defendant has no right to interfere in use of the disputed property and to cause hindrance in repair thereof or to encroach upon the same merely because it abuts his house. Since learned lower court has failed to appreciate these facts, therefore, findings returned by the lower court on this issue are not sustainable. Resultantly, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.”

5. While deciding issue No.3, the appellate court observed that the suit was maintainable in a representative capacity.

6. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the defendant has come up in appeal.

7. The substantial questions of law framed by this Court on 7.7.2009 are reproduced as under :

1. Whether an injunction could have been issued against the appellant in view of the recital in the agreements dated 15.9.1997 and 17.9.1997 Exs.D-1 and D-3 that possession had been delivered to the appellant?

2. Whether the appellant is entitled to protect his possession by invoking the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act?

8. Before proceeding to decide the aforesaid substantial questions of law framed by this Court, it may be observed that the site in dispute is admittedly a plot having no khasra number and there






















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