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2008 Supreme(P&H) 60

2008 (2) RCR(Civ) 60
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
S.S. SARON, DAYA CHAUDHARY, JJ.
Subhash Tyagi. ....Petitioner
Versus
Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of Haryana and Others. ..... Respondents
CWP No. 377 of 2008
Decided On : January 11, 2008

Advocates Appeared:
Mr. V.K. Jain, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ashok Tyagi, Advocate for the petitioner.

The court emphasized the importance of following the prescribed procedure for hearing appeals and avoiding premature interference in matters pending before statutory authorities.

Headnote:

Suspension - Principles of Natural Justice - Article 226 - [Sarpanch Suspension] - [Article 226 of the Constitution of India] - [No specific act or section referenced]

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a Sarpanch, sought to quash the suspension orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary to Government Haryana. The petitioner argued that the suspension was illegal and violated the principles of natural justice.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the appeal was pending before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary, and it would be improper to interfere at that stage. The court also noted that the matter was listed for hearing and that the appellate authority had passed an order to stop the commercialization and mis-utilization of Panchayat land.

Issues: The issues revolved around the legality of the suspension of the Sarpanch without a hearing and the pending appeal before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that it would be premature to interfere in the matter while the appeal was pending before the statutory authority. It emphasized that the procedure prescribed for hearing the appeal should not be circumvented by resorting to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Final Decision: The civil writ petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was allowed to retain the records of the Panchayat and other property until the next date of hearing before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary.

JUDGMENT

S.S. SARON,J. (ORAL) - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking quashing of the orders dated 02.01.2008 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon (respondent No.2) and dated 07.01.2008 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary to Government Haryana, Development and Panchayats Department, Chandigarh (respondent No.3).

2. In terms of the order dated 02.01.2008 (Annexure P-2), the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon (respondent No.2) placed the petitioner under suspension. It was inter alia observed on the basis of the report of the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Sohna (respondent No.3) and after visit to the site that the land of the Gram Panchayat, which had been leased out by the petitioner was being used for commercial purposes and was in the possession of a Company. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order suspending him approached the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary to Government Haryana Development and Panchayats Department, Chandigarh (respondent No.1) in which the notice has been issued for 22.01.2008 and it has been observed that the application for stay shall be decided on giving of notice keeping in view the facts of the case.

3. Learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order placing the petitioner under suspension is illegal besides being devoid of any merit inasmuch as the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. A reference has been made to three Division Bench judgments of this Court in i) Om Parkash Sarpanch v. Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, 2001 (3) RCR (Civil) 628 (ii) Hazari Lal, Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Harsana Kalan, Distt. Sonepat v. The Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government, Haryana Development and Panchayats Department, Chandigarh, 2003 (3) PLR 596 and (iii) Jagtar Singh v. State of Haryana and another, 2004 (1) PLR 368. It is strenuously contended that a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat is an elected representative of the local bodies and an order placing him under suspension without hearing is a material irregularity and illegality, which per se vitiates the impugned order and therefore, the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon suspending the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch is liable to be quashed even though, an appeal against the same is pending before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary to Government Haryana Development and Panchayats Department, Chandigarh. In any case it is submitted that the operation of the same is liable to be suspended till the matter is disposed of by the appellate authority.

4. We have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions of the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner. However, we are unable to accept the same. It is no doubt that it is fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which would affect the rights of any person without giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case. However, it may be noticed that the present is a case where an appeal is still pending before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Principal Secretary to Government Haryana Development and Panchayats Department, Chandigarh and notice has also been issued on the application for stay for 22.01.2008. Therefore, keeping in view the fact that the matter is pending before a statutory authority who is competent to hear the appeal, it would be improper at this stage to interfere in the matter. Even otherwise in certain cases like a case of admitted and undisputed facts and no prejudice being shown, the violation of the rule per se would not warrant the invalidation of an administrative order. Besides, the matter can even be remitted to the stage at which the fault was pointed out. This, however, is for the appellate authority to consider and it would be premature for this Court to go into the these aspects at this stage. The petitioner may, therefore, purs



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