The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of prior sanction for land transfer under Section 44A of the Land Acquisition Act and the principles of natural justice in administrative actions with civil consequences.

RAJIVE BHALLA,J - Prayer in this writ petition, filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned notice of resumption, dated 6.1.2005, issued by respondent No.1.

A brief narrative of the facts of the case would be appropriate. The respondent-State acquired 358 kanals of land, situated in village Sankhol, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak, for the petitioner-company. The Collector assessed compensation and pronounced an Award on 20.6.1974. After payment of the amount assessed, possession was handed over to the petitioner and a deed of conveyance, dated 16.10.1974 was executed by the State in favour of the petitioner. The land owners filed reference petitions, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short herein after referred to as “the Act”). The Additional District Judge, Rohtak enhanced compensation, vide award, dated 29.1.1979. Being dis-satisfied with the amount awarded, by the reference Court, the landowners assailed the award before the High Court. The High Court enhanced the market value to Rs.8.10 lacs. In the meanwhile, execution proceedings were initiated by the land owners to recover the amount awarded. As the petitioner failed to pay the awarded amount, the acquired land was attached by the executing Court, vide its order, dated 29.8.1987. Vide order, dated 25.2.1989, the property was ordered to be sold. The petitioner moved an application, under Order 21 Rule 83 of the CPC, requesting that the sale be postponed to enable him to raise the decretal amount by private sale of the acquired land. Vide order, dated 7.5.1991, the Additional District Judge, Rohtak granted permission to the petitioner to sell the property. The petitioner sold a part of the property and discharged his liability.

2. Thereafter certain land owners, filed a writ petition before this Court, impugning the acquisition proceedings. Vide judgment, dated 5.3.1992, passed in CWP No.14735 of 1991, this Court quashed the proceedings for acquisition and directed the petitioner herein to restore the land to the original land owners.

3. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment, the petitioner filed SLP (C ) No.9104 of 1992 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was subsequently registered as Civil Appeal No.7023 of 1993. Eventually, vide judgment, dated 29.10.2002, the High Court's judgment was set aside. However, while allowing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it would be open to the State Government to take action against the petitioner for restitution of the land.

The petitioner thereafter carved out 134 plots and sold them in the open market. The State of Haryana served a notice, dated 6.1.2005, resuming the entire land, transferred to the petitioner, and directed the petitioner to restore its possession.

4. Counsel for the petitioner contends that a major part of the land was sold, pursuant to permission, granted by the executing Court, namely, the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Rohtak. The State of Haryana was a party to these proceedings and did not raise any objection with respect to the sale. Consequently, the impugned order/notice of resumption could not have been passed, without taking into consideration the aforementioned facts. It is further argued that as the State of Haryana was a party to the execution proceedings, it could not have invoked the provisions of the conveyance deed, which required the petitioner to seek prior permission for sale of the land, and as a necessary corollary, the State would be deemed to have granted permission for sale of the land .

5. It is also argued that the impugned order/notice is void and non-est, being violative of the principles of natural justice. The notice is an order of resumption, directing the petitioner to restore possession to the State and, therefore, could only have been passed, after the service of a show cause notice and the grant of a reasonable opportuni