The initiation of proceedings under Section 340 of the Code requires a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and must be expedient in the interests of justice.

Satish Kumar Mittal, J. - The petitioners, who are the Branch Managers and Assistant Manager, have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for quashing of the order dated 4.2.2003 passed by the District Judge, Kurukshetra whereby the order dated 3.5.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kurukshetra dismissing the application of the respondent filed under Section 340 of the Code for initiation of prosecution against the petitioners, has been set aside.

2. The brief facts of this case, which are necessary for the adjudication of this petition, are that a suit for recovery of Rs. 70,060/- was filed by the State Bank of Patiala, Kurukshetra against Dilar Singh (respondent herein) and others, (heirs of Avtar Singh, and guarantors of the loan taken by Avtar Singh). The said suit was instituted on 7.9.1996, was signed by petitioner No. 1 as the Branch Manager. The suit arose out of an outstanding debt towards Avtar Singh, who had taken an agricultural loan from the bank. The suit was filed against the legal heirs as the loanee Avtar Singh had died on 11.10.1992. Amongst the documents relied upon to prove the suit for recovery being within limitation, a revival letter dated 9.10.1992 (Ex. P-11) executed by Avtar Singh, acknowledging the outstanding amount and an undertaking dated 1.8.1995 (Ex. P-12) to pay the same and thereby confirming the balance amount due, executed by the heirs of Avtar Singh, were placed on the record of the civil suit.

3. The defendants while contesting the suit being barred by limitation, disputed the genuineness of the letter dated 9.10.1992 (Ex. P-11). When the evidence of the plaintiff bank was going on, the defendants moved an application dated 8.11.2000 seeking permission to compare the thumb impression of Avtar Singh on the aforesaid letter (Ex. P-11) with his admitted thumb impression. The said application was dismissed vide order dated 12.2.2001. The revision petition filed against the said order was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 23.8.2001.

4. During the pendency of the civil suit, the respondent (who was one of the defendant in the above suit), moved an application dated 20.12.2001 for initiation of proceedings against the petitioners under Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code for having allegedly committed offences under Sections 193, 209, 210, 419, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Indian Penal Code in respect of the document Ex. P-11. In the application, it has been alleged that the letter dated 9.10.1992 alleged to have been thumb impressed by Avtar Singh is a forged and fictitious document and the same was relied upon by the bank to prove the suit of time barred debt within limitation.

5. Subsequently, the suit of the bank was decreed by the trial Court while holding that all the documents produced by the bank including letter dated 9.10.1992 (Ex. P-11) and letter dated 1.8.1995 (Ex. P-12) have been duly proved and the suit filed by the bank was within the period of limitation. The trial Court also dismissed the aforesaid application filed by the respondent under Section 340 of the Code vide order dated 3.5.2002 while observing as under :-

".... After giving thoughtful consideration on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, this Court is of the considered opinion that a letter promising to pay time barred debt dated 9.10.1992 which is Ex. P-11 has been fully proved by the respondents in Civil Suit No. 376/2000 titled as State Bank of Patiala v. Daler Singh and others. Also the time barred debt as alleged by the applicant has been admitted by them, therefore, now it does not lie to their mouth that on Ex. P-11 deceased Avtar Singh has not penned down his thumb impression/signatures, therefore, once the time barred debt has been admitted by the applicant and has been fully proved in civil suit No. 376/2000, it can be well executed and once executed as in the present case t