The judgment emphasizes the importance of specific and sustainable allegations, the discretion of the Magistrate in issuing process, and the need to prevent the misuse of provisions for the protection of women in matrimonial disputes.

Mahesh Grover, J. - The petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 382 of Criminal Procedure Code, praying for quashing of complaint (Annexure P-1) dated 4.4.2002 under Section 406 Indian Penal Code.

2. The petitioners are the brother-in-law and sister-in-law (Jeth and Jethani) of the complainant. The marriage of the complainant was performed with one Tarlochan Singh according to Sikh rites at Jalandhar on 15.7.1990. However, unfortunately, the relation between the husband and wife become strained. The complainant filed the complaint (Annexure P-1) against the petitioners, as also against Tarlochan Singh under Section 406/34 Indian Penal Code.

3. Pursuant to the complaint and after recording the preliminary evidence, the petitioners were summoned vide order dated 18.11.2005.

4. The petitioners have assailed the aforesaid order and have sought quashing of the complaint as well as the summoning order. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners are old persons in the age group of seventies and perusal of the complaint also shows that the allegations are absolutely vague and no specific averments have been made qua them.

On the other hand, Shri H.S. Gill, learned senior counsel for the respondent has contended that there are specific allegations against the petitioners, which have been reflected in para 3 of the complaint.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the complaint as well as the impugned order.

6. The Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1976 page 1947 has observed as follows :-

"It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court or even the Supreme Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 which culminates into an order under Section 204. Thus in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:

(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like."

7-8. In the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866, the Honble Supreme Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercise to quash proceedings :

(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) Where the allegation in the First In