Lambardar--Appointment of--Lambardar is not a post in that sense where the claim of persons of different categories can be considered inter se.
Lambardar--Appointment of--In case of acquittal, no disqualification should result on mere involvement in FIR.

Mr. Ranjit Singh, J.: - The petitioner was a candidate for appointment to the post of Lambardar of village Gopal Pur, which fell vacant on the death of Hakam Singh, previous Lambardar. The petitioner and Malkiat Singh (respondent No.3) filed applications for appointment to the post of Lambardar. Antecedents of the candidates were checked by Assistant Collector 2nd Grade. He did not make any comment against the petitioner or the other applicants. Assistant Collector 1st Grade recommended the name of Malkiat Singh (respondent No.3). After perusing the record, the Collector appointed petitioner as Lambardar on 26.5.2009. The petitioner claims that during the life time of Hakam Singh, previous Lambardar, he had been appointed as Sarbrah Lambardar as Hakam Singh himself had expressed his inability to perform his duties because of his old age and ill-health.

2. Respondent No.3 filed an appeal against this order passed by the Collector. He mainly raised two points to contest this appointment. Respondent No.3 would first contend that the petitioner contested the election of the post of Sarpanch from the reserved category of Sirkiband, which is a scheduled caste. Otherwise also, there were allegations against the petitioners that he was involved in an FIR for offences under Sections 353 and 307 IPC. Respondent No.3 was also allegedly involved in some criminal case. The Commissioner, on the basis of pleas so raised, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had contested the election of Sarpanch by mentioning caste being a scheduled caste, but has now shown himself to be a Rajput, which is an open category for seeking the present appointment as Lambardar. The Commissioner, thus, found that the petitioner is not man having clean character and had not been honest in seeking this appointment.

3. Both the candidates were found involved in criminal cases, though they both had been acquitted. Commissioner found this to be a stigma, which, according to him was not completely washed of with the acquittal. He accordingly set-aside the appointment of the petitioner and issued directions for initiating a fresh process for appointment of Lambardar by inviting fresh applications. The petitioner filed a revision against this order before the Financial Commissioner, who allegedly without discussing merits of the candidates or the illegality in the order passed by the Commissioner has dismissed the revision on 30.5.2012. Certain allegations are also made that the Financial Commissioner, who heard the case has not passed the order. It is stated that the case was heard by Shri G. Vajralingam, IAS, Financial Commissioner on 7.12.2011 and he reserved the order for pronouncement. In the meantime, the said officer was transferred and the case was then taken up by the new incumbent. The case was shown to have been heard when the office of Financial Commissioner in place of the earlier officer was lying vacant. On this basis, it is stated that on 30.5.2012 the order was pronounced without hearing the parties. The order shows that both the parties were heard, which is factually inaccurate.

4. Counsel for the petitioner has referred to two grounds considered by the Commissioner to upset the appointment of the petitioner as Lambardar by the Collector. He would first contend that no doubt FIR was registered against the petitioner under Sections 353 and 307 IPC, but prosecution itself moved an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. for withdrawing from the prosecution against the petitioner in this case. The counsel has placed reliance on a few judgments of this court where it is held that mere involvement in FIR cannot be taken as a disqualification or disadvantage for appointment as a Lambardar. No judgment, however, was cited. Not only that, even in case of acquittal, no disqualification should result on mere involvement in FIR. If it is held in any other manner that mere involvement in the FIR would be stigmatic, the acquittal would be of no consequenc