Dishonour of Cheque--Offence by company--Issuance of Summoning order --If the accused is a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.

Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.: (Oral) - As identical points of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to dispose of above indicated petitions to quash the impugned complaints & summoning orders, by virtue of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. However, the crux of the facts, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions, has been extracted from (1) CRM No. M-24079 of 2011 titled as “Pankaj Badlani & Ors. Vs. M/s Nectar Lifesciences Ltd. & Ors.” for ready reference in this context.

2. Tersely, the facts & material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the present petitions and emanating from the record, are that initially, M/s Nectar Lifesciences Limited complainant-respondent No.1 (for brevity “the complainant”) filed the criminal complaints under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter to be referred as “the NI Act”), inter-alia, pleading that the impugned cheques issued by the petitioners-accused in order to discharge their legal liability were dishonoured. They did not make the payment, despite legal notices within a statutory period. Thus, they have committed the pointed offence.

3. Taking cognizance of the complaints, the trial Court summoned the petitioners-accused to face the trial under section 138 of the NI Act, by way of impugned summoning order dated 5.3.2011. The similar impugned summoning orders were passed as well in the other connected cases instituted on similar private complaints.

4. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners-accused preferred the instant petitions to challenge the impugned complaints and summoning orders, invoking the provisions of section 482 Cr.PC.

5. The case, inter-alia set up by the petitioners-accused, in brief in so far as relevant, was that the complainant has filed the false complaints against them. They have been arrayed as accused only in the capacity of Directors of Cecil Pharmaceuticals Private Limited (respondent No.11), without pleading therein that they are in any way responsible for the commission of indicated offence as required u/s 141 of the NI Act. The trial Court was stated to have mechanically summoned them without the application of mind, by way of non-speaking impugned summoning orders. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitionersaccused sought to quash the impugned complaints & summoning orders in the manner depicted here-in-above.

6. Faced with the grave situation, although initially, the complainant has vaguely refuted the prayer in question and filed the reply, but during the course of hearing, its learned counsel has very fairly conceded that petitioners-accused have been arrayed as accused only on account of Directors of company-respondent No.11 and no other overtact as contemplated in section 141 of the NI Act is attributed to them.

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record & legal provisions with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the present petitions deserve to be partly accepted in this respect.

8. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the petitioners-accused did not press the prayer, for quashing the impugned complaints at this stage, without prejudice to their rights in any manner. However, the argument of learned counsel that vague, non-speaking impugned summoning orders are not only arbitrary & illegal, but against the statutory provisions of section 141 of the NI Act, has considerable force.

9. As is evident from the record, that the complainant has filed the complaints under section 138 of the NI Act against the petitioners-accused only in the capacity of Directors of company respondent No.11. Section 141 postulates that if the person committed an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company