The main legal point established is the retrospective applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and the Rules, and the entitlement of individuals claiming juvenility at the time of the offence to seek release under habeas corpus.

M.M.S. BEDI, J.

Shamsher Singh, petitioner has filed this petition for issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus holding that the petitioner is entitled to be released forthwith under Section 64 read with Sections 15 and 16 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, (for short ‘the Act’) read with Rules 97 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, (for short ‘the Rules), claiming that the detention of the petitioner has become violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as he has undergone the maximum period of detention under the ibid Act.

Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was tried in FIR No. 360 dated July 15, 1992 registered at Police Station Sadar Panipat, under Sections 302, 307, 34 IPC and was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.5000/- under Section 302/34 IPC and imprisonment for 5 years alongwith fine of Rs.1000/- under Section 307/34 IPC. Both the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently vide judgment dated January 21, 1995. Appeal filed by the petitioner against the conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court. The petitioner at present is confined in District Jail, Karnal and is undergoing life imprisonment. The total period spent by the petitioner in detention before conviction and after conviction including the remissions granted by the jail authorities and Government deducting the period of parole comes to 14 years 2 months and 26 days. The petitioner has now undergone more than 10 years of actual sentence. The petitioner claims that he was born on July 13, 1976 as per the certificate issued by the Board of School Education, Haryana. The petitioner had allegedly committed murder of one Vijender Singh on July 15, 1992 as such on July 15, 992 he was 16 years 2 days old as his date of birth is July 13, 1976. The petitioner was convicted on January 21, 1995. The Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat found the age of the petitioner as 18 years on the date of conviction and sentence in FIR No.360 dated July 15, 1992. The trial was conducted on the basis of the age certificate of Board of School of Education, annexure P-2, indicating that the petitioner was more than 16 years at the time of commission of offence. The petitioner claims that he was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence i.e. on July 15, 1992 as such he has become entitled to the benefit of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. A strong reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Hari Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & another, 2009 (2) RCR (Crl.) 878 in which it has been observed that all the accused between the age group of 16 to 18 years convicted or still facing trial under Juvenile Act, 1986 would be treated as juvenile under the Act and the provisions of Rules framed under the said Act in 2007 would have retrospective effect by virtue of Rule 12 of the Rules, read with Sections 64 and 15 of the Act.

The short question which is required to be determined in the present case is whether the petitioner who was admittedly more than 16 years of age and less than 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence can be granted the benefit of his juvenility for the purpose of his release as per Section 15 of the Act which lays down that the maximum period of detention of the child is 3 years. Rule 98 of the Rules provide that in disposed of cases of juvenile in conflict with law, the State Government is authorized to review of the case of a person or a juvenile; determine his juvenility in terms of the provisions contained in the Act and Rule 12 and pass an appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile under Section 64 of the Act for immediate release of the juvenile in conflict with law whose period of detention or imprisonment has exceeded the maximum period provided in Section 15 of the Act. The stand taken by the respondents is that the petitioner is no