ORDER OF REFERENCE

MEHAR SINGH, J. :- Tara Singh respondent was serving a sentence of 20 years imprisonment in a murder case and his mother, Kartar Kaur respondent, on his behalf, instituted a suit to preempt a certain sale. In that suit she deposited Rs. 2,000/- as one-fifth of the value of the property as security according to Section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913). The suit was decreed with the usual condition that if the pre-emptor deposited the remaining amount, on the basis of which the pre-emption decree was made, by or before March 10, 1960, he would be entitled to possession of the property, otherwise the suit shall stand dismissed. Tara Singh respondents mother failed to make the deposit of the remaining amount with the result that the pre-emption suit was dismissed on the date last mentioned.

2. Appellant Maharaj Kishan instituted a suit to recover Rs. 2,500/- principal and Rs. 100/- as interest from the respondents, Tara Singh and his mother Kartar Kaur. It appears that in that suit also, Tara Singh was represented by his mother Kartar Kaur. There was a compromise between the parties in that suit and in that compromise, which was arrived at on June 30, 1960, according to the learned trial Judge, there is mention of the amount of Rs. 2,000/- lying in deposit in the Court of the subordinate Judge in which the pre-emption suit had been filed and the parties said that that sum is to be attached in satisfaction of the decree obtained by the appellant against the respondents and the remaining amount was to be realised subsequently after the expiry of a period of one month.

3. The appellant seeks to attach that amount and the respondents having sought protection of Section 11 or Punjab Act 1 of 1913, their objection has prevailed in both the Courts below and so the amount has not been attached so as to make it available in execution of the money decree of the appellant against the respondents.

4. This is a second appeal by the appellant, who is the decree-holder in the money decree, and it first cams before Mahajan, J., when the learned counsel for the appellant advanced the argument that Kartar Kaur respondent delegated authority in favour of the appellant by the compromise in the money suit to enable the appellant to withdraw the money by way of attachment, and consequently there is no case of any protection to the respondents under Section 11 of the said Act. It was also urged before the learned Judge that the pre-emption suit having been dismissed and the amount of the deposit being available to the pre-emptor for withdrawal, the compromise between the parties should be given effect to, for, in the circumstances. Sec. 11 of the said Act is not attracted. These arguments were controverted on behalf of the respondents. The learned Judge on December 13, 1961, made a reference of the case to a larger Bench on the ground that the matter is not only difficult but also important and that it was desirable that the case be decided by such a Bench. This is how this second appeal has come before us.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to urge here the first ground that he urged before the learned Single Judge for the simple reason that the compromise in the money suit delegates no power to the appellant and it gives no authority to the appellant to withdraw the amount, it any such power was given by the compromise to the appellant, he could have gone to the Court in which the amount remained deposited and could have withdrawn the amount. All that the compromise says is that the parties agreed that the amount will be liable to attachment. So this argument has not been pressed before us. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, urged another aspect of the case and that is that the protection under Section 11 of Act 1 of 1913 is for the benefit of the pre-emptor and the vendee in a pre-emption suit and as, according to him, the protection is not based on conside