Mr. Mehinder Singh Sulllar, J.: (Oral) - As identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to dispose of above indicated petitions, to quash the impugned complaints & summoning orders, by means of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. However, the epitome of the facts, which requires a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions, has been extracted from (1) CRM No.M-600 of 2012, titled as “Varinder Kumar Gupta and others Versus M/s Creative Clothing” for ready reference in this context.

2. The matrix of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the present petitions and emanating from the record, is that initially, complainant-respondent M/s Creative Clothing(for brevity “the complainant”) has filed the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(hereinafter to be referred as the N.I.Act”) read with Section 420 IPC, inter alia, pleading that the petitioners-accused are the Directors of M/s Koutons Retail India Limited(accused No.1). The impugned cheques issued by the accused in order to discharge their legal and enforceable liability were dishonoured. They did not make the payment of the impugned amount, despite legal notices within a statutory period. Thus, they have committed the indicated offences.

3. Taking cognizance of the complaint(Annexure P-1), the trial Court summoned the petitioners-accused, to face the trial for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, by virtue of impugned summoning order dated 07.04.2011(Annexure P-2). The similar impugned summoning orders were passed as well in the other connected cases instituted on similar private complaints.

4. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners-accused have preferred the instant petitions, to challenge the impugned complaints and summoning orders, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. in this Court.

5. The case, inter alia, set-up by the petitioners-accused, in brief in so far as relevant is that, the complainants have filed the false complaints against them. They have been arrayed as accused only in the capacity of Directors of the Company, without pleading therein that they are, in any way, responsible for the commission of the offences in question, as contemplated under Section 141 of the N.I.Act. The trial Court was stated to have mechanically summoned them without the application of mind, by way of non-speaking impugned summoning orders. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused sought to quash the impugned complaints and summoning orders, in the manner described here-in-above.

6. Faced with the grave situation, although initially, the complainants have vaguely refuted the prayer of the petitioners in a routine manner, but during the course of hearing, their learned counsel has very fairly conceded and acknowledged that they have been arrayed as an accused only on account of Directors of Company(accused No.1) and no other specific role or overt-act as envisaged under Section 141 of the N.I. Act is attributed to them.

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record & legal provisions with their valuable assistance and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the present petitions deserve to be partly accepted in this context.

8. At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioners-accused did not press the prayer, for quashing the impugned complaints at this stage, without prejudice to their legal rights in any manner. Ex facie, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that vague and non-speaking impugned summoning orders are not only arbitrary and illegal, but against the statutory provisions of Section 141 of the N.I.Act, has considerable force.

9. As is evident from the record, that the complainants have filed the complaints under section 138 of the N.