Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- The revision petition challenges the order of the appellate authority that set aside the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller. Before the Rent Controller, the revision petitioner sought for ejectment of the tenant contending that the respondent was not paying the rent. The statement in defence by the tenant was that he had taken the property from the petitioner, who was acting as a Manager of the demised property and he was later removed as a Manager and that he was still paying the rent to the subsequent office bearers of the sabha. The Court held that when the property had been granted on lease by the petitioner, the capacity in which he was granted, was irrelevant and for all purposes, he must be taken to be the landlord entitled to collect the rent.

2. In appeal by the tenant, the appellate Court had occasion to consider the fact that in relation to the very same property, among other properties, in proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. pertaining to rival claims in relation to the property to keep peace, the Executive Magistrate had passed an order constituting the Tehsildar, Ambala, to act as a receiver and during the relevant time from 21.11.1988 to 26.02.1992, the property was in the hands of the receiver, but the petition however had been filed during the interregnum on 18.04.1990. The Court therefore found that the petitioner did not have even any competency to file the case and the proceedings showed that the petition had not been filed by the petitioner in his capacity as an office bearer of the sabha and that it had been filed during the time when there was an attachment and the Tehsildar was the receiver. Consequently, he found the petition to be not maintainable.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. cannot cast a shadow on the entitlement of a person, who had created a lease to apply for ejectment, for, as far as the tenant was concerned, he alone was the landlord. Normally, in rent control proceedings, the issue of title or ownership is not taken and the landlord must be seen as a person, who was entitled to receive the rent. This must be always understood in a proper legal context that the person’s entitlement to receive rent could be in different capacity otherwise than in personal capacity. A plea that the issue of entitlement is irrelevant ought not to be understood as making irrelevant also the issue of what capacity a person receives the rent. If the contention of the tenant was that he had been paying rent to the petitioner at a time when he was acting as a Manager and that subsequently he had been paying the rent still to the sabha through yet another person, who claimed to be the Manager, it was imperative for the petitioner to show in what capacity he was receiving and that he was not receiving the rent in any managerial capacity, but in his own individual capacity. This is shown to be not correct at least from the proceedings which were brought before the Court and filed as an evidence before the Rent Controller and which was considered by the appellate Court. The appellate Court had specifically adverted to the fact that in respect of the demised property, there were proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and during the relevant time when the petition was filed, the property was in the hands of the receiver.

4. I reject the arguments made by the learned counsel that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. will have no bearing to the rent control proceedings. As observed, it has to be always seen in the context in which the order is sought to be issued. There could be no rule of thumb that Section 145 Cr.P.C. will have no meaning to the rent control proceedings. In this case, if the issue that fell for consideration was whether the petitioner had rented out the property in his own capacity or in a representative capacity, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. surely raise an issue o