Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in the second appeal:-

i) Whether the plaintiffs had any subsisting right to the property during the lifetime of the mother to institute the suit and question the decree that was allowed between the mother and her grandchildren through another daughter?

ii) Whether the decree allowing for the properties to be taken by the grandchildren through one of the daughters was a family settlement, as pleaded and hence, did not require to be registered?

iii) Whether the grandchildren through the daughter have any pre-existing right that could allow for devolution even without registration of consent decree suffered by the mother?

2. Before I begin my discourse on the points raised, I must observe that it had been a long time practice of this Court to admit second appeal without framing any substantial question of law. Later, when the law was such a procedure was mandatory, it has been supplanted by a practice of lawyers appearing for appellants to frame the substantial questions in a separate memorandum and the Court placing it on record. We shall remind ourselves that it is again a wrong procedure. It is the Court’s duty to elicit the questions of law, formulate them and place them on record and direct the attention of the counsel to address arguments on the formulated questions. This preface is to govern our own judicial procedure and it is expected that the bar assists the Court in framing substantial questions of law and apprise itself about the formulations before the arguments are addressed.

3. The second appeal is at the instance of the defendants against whom there was a suit filed for a declaration that the decree allowing for the properties to be in the ownership and possession of the grandchildren of Dhapan (mother of plaintiffs) was brought about by fraud and not binding. There was a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs’ 2/3rd share on a plea made by the plaintiffs that they were the owners of the property to a 2/3rd share by a gift by their mother at the time of their respective marriages. The defendants, who were the mother, sister and sister’s children of the plaintiffs, entered a contest denying that the plaintiffs had any locus standi to file the present suit and that there had been no oral gift in favour of the plaintiffs by the mother-6th defendant. It was also contended that the suit properties had been the subject of a decree in Case No.438 of 1979 in favour of the grandchildren described as defendants 2 to 5.

4. The suit had gone for a trial on the contentions raised by the parties including an issue of whether the decree was null and void and liable to be set aside in the manner contended by the plaintiffs. The maintainability of the suit in the present form was also taken as an issue for consideration. The trial Court found that the plea that the property had been settled in their favour was not established and the Court also observed with reference to the khasra girdwaris that they were in the names of the defendants 2 to 5 and 7 and the plaintiffs could have no concern whatsoever with it. However, taking up the issue of locus standi of the plaintiffs, the Court observed that the defendants had not shown as to how the plaintiffs did not have a locus standi. The trial Court predominantly went on the admission made by the mother in the written statement admitting to the right and title of the grandchildren and dismissed the suit. In appeal filed, through a judgment which is as cryptic and laconic, the appellate Court relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Kuppuswami Chettiar Versus A.S.P.A. Arumugam Chettiar and another-AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1395 that a decree passed suppressing an important fact would be vitiated and that the material factor of existence of two daughters not having been set forth in the written statement filed by