2014 Supreme(P&H) 145
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Before
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Paramjeet Singh
RSA No. 878 of 1987
Hukam Chand & Anr.
v.
Ram Dia (since deceased) through LRs.
{Decided on 20/02/2014}
For the Appellants:Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, Advocate.
Headnote:Dohlidar--Limited rights of Dohlidar cannot be converted in proprietary rights.
Dohlidar--This Act does not apply to a dispute between ‘dohlidar’ and the person who is purchaser from ‘dohlidar’.
(A) Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010--Held;
(i) That the Act is prospective in nature and is applicable with effect from 09.06.2011.
(ii) A ‘dohlidar’ has no right to execute sale deed in respect of the ‘dohli’ prior to 09.06.2011 as he cannot acquire title prior to that date.
(iii) Therefore, the Act is not applicable to appeals pending on 09.06.2011.
(B) Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010--Full Ownership--Held; if a person claimed himself to be the full owner and paying revenue it was obligatory for him to produce the Sharat Wajib-Ul-Arz or any other cogent evidence to support this claim. (Para 33)
(C) Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010--Limited rights of Dohlidar cannot be converted in proprietary rights--In present case, revenue records reveals that ‘dohli’ will be without payment of rent being gift and revenue will be paid by the owner and ‘aabyana’ will be paid by the dohlidar--Meaning there by limited rights have been given to plaintiff and ownership vests in the original owners--Therefore, it is clear that ‘dohli’ was created for limited purpose and the ownership rights do not vest in dohlidar and the same is not alienable--Sale deeds executed by such dohlidar, having limited rights, rightly set aside. (Para 37)
(D) Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010--Applicability of Act--Held; this Act is applicable between the land ‘owner’ and ‘dohlidar’ and their predecessors and successors-in-interest--This Act does not apply to a dispute between ‘dohlidar’ and the person who is purchaser from ‘dohlidar’--In the civil suit, even owner is not a party--Thus, right qua conferring title on the ‘dohlidar’ is not in issue, nor required to be determined--It is settled principle of law that a statute does not operate retrospectively unless it is specifically provided for in the statute. (Para 24)
Mr. Paramjeet Singh, J.: - This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.03.1986 passed by learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Panipat whereby suit for possession filed by respondent-plaintiff has been decreed and against the judgment and decree dated 07.02.1987 passed by learned District Judge, Karnal whereby appeal preferred by appellants-defendants has been dismissed.
2. For convenience sake, reference to parties is being made as per their status in the suit.
3. The detailed facts are already recapitulated in the judgments of the courts below and are not required to be reproduced. However, the brief facts for disposal of this second appeal are to the effect that the plaintiff was a ‘dohlidar’ of land measuring 16 kanals 8 marlas, situated in village Matlauda, Tehsil Panipat, fully described in para 1 of plaint. The plaintiff executed two sale deeds with regard to said land in favour of the defendants on 11.05.1973 for a consideration of Rs.3,000/-. The plaintiff challenged the sale deeds on ground of fraud. It was pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff had given the land on lease for five years to the defendants, but they had fraudulently got executed the sale deeds in their faovur. The plaintiff was only a ‘dohlidar’ of the said land and he had no right to alienate the same. It was further pleaded that the sale deeds are void, ab initio, therefore, the plaintiff filed suit for possession of the suit land.
4. Upon notice, the defendants resisted the suit and filed written statement. It was pleaded that the defendants had not played any fraud upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff had executed the sale deeds in favour of the defendants after knowing its contents and without any pressure. Otherwise also, the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit; the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct from filing the suit; suit is bad for mis-joinder of the parties and cause of action and also barred by limitation.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court of first instance framed following issues:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is a dohlidar of the said village and the impugned alienation regarding the land in question is void, ab initio? If so, to what effect?OPP
2 Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to bring the present suit?OPD
3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his own acts and conduct?OPD
4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties?OPD
5. Whether the suit has not been signed and verified in accordance with the law? If so, to what effect?OPD
6. Whether the suit has been wrongly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction?OPD
7. Whether the suit is time barred?OPD
8. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred?OPD
9. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs u/s 35-A CPC?OPD
10. Relief.”
6. After appreciating the evidence led by parties, the Court of first instance decreed the suit directing the defendants to hand over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within sixty days from the date of judgment. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants preferred an appeal which has been dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. Hence, this regular second appeal.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. When the appeal was admitted, no substantial question of law was framed. However, during the pendency of appeal, following substantial questions of law have been placed on record by learned counsel for the appellants:
(i) Whether the plaintiff-respondent sold the suit land vide registered sale deed dated 11.05.1973 and delivered the possession in pursuance thereof to the defendants-appellants?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff after having sold the suit land is estopped from claiming possession of the suit land?
(iii) Whether the plaintiff-respondent filed the present suit for a decree of possession by alleging that the defendants played a fraud by getting sale deeds executed instead of a lease deed