PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
K. Kannan, J.
Kamla - Appellant
Versus
Roshan Lal and Ors. - Respondent
Civil Revision No. 2956 of 2014 (O&M)
Decided On : 19-03-2015
Interim Injunction - Property Rights - Hindu Succession Act - Section 6, Explanation-1 and 2 - The court discussed the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and the rights of a daughter in ancestral property before and after the amendment of 2005. It highlighted the legal implications of the father's actions during his lifetime on the daughter's right to claim succession. The court also emphasized the need for a strong prima facie case for granting an interim order.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a daughter, filed a suit claiming a share in the ancestral property left behind by her father. The trial Court granted an interim injunction, which was modified by the appellate Court. The plaintiff challenged the appellate Court's order before the court.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff did not have a strong prima facie case to claim a share in the property. It emphasized the legal implications of the Hindu Succession Act and the father's actions on the daughter's right to succession.
Issues: The main issue was the plaintiff's claim to a share in the ancestral property and the grant of interim injunction by the trial Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiff did not have a strong prima facie case to claim a share in the property based on the legal provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and the father's actions during his lifetime.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision petition and sustained the appellate Court's order, which modified the interim injunction granted by the trial Court.
1. The revision petition is against the order of the appellate Court passed pending suit modifying the order passed by the trial Court issuing interim injunction sought at the instance of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's contention was that his father Ghisa Ram had died in the year 1993 and before his death, he was alleged to have suffered a decree in favour of his grandsons, admitting the right claimed by the grandsons. The daughter has filed a suit in the year 2012, contending that the father's decree will not bind her and has sought for a declaration that she has a 1/4th share in the property and for injunction restraining the respondents from sale of the property.
2. In order that a person obtains an interim order, the test shall invariably be that the plaintiff has a prima facie case and if the injunction is not granted, very serious prejudice would be caused. This is a case of a daughter making a claim at 65 years to the share alleged to have left behind by the father and over which, she has a right which is sought to be taken away. The trial Court granted the relief of injunction and the appellate Court set it aside but directed that any alienation and construction by the defendants shall be done after taking permission from the court. It is this order which is put in challenge by the plaintiff before this court.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on several judgments which are in my view wholly irrelevant, but I cite them one after another to point out to the untenability of the pleas made. The counsel would rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum Versus Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and others- AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1235 to say that the widow's interest in the coparcenary property will be worked out by applying Section 6 proviso and Explanation-1 by invoking a notional partition as made just before the institution of the suit and allot her share equivalent to her son. All over India that follows the Mitakshara, except Bombay, provided for a share at a notional partition only amongst coparceners, namely, of the father and the sons and granted no right to a widow. Only the Bombay school provided for a share to the widow equal to that of the sons. The Supreme Court was, therefore, according to the widow a 1/4th share which is not possible for any division of coparcenary property in Punjab. The reliance of the judgment of the Supreme Court is, therefore, irrelevant for our case. All that can be noticed in this case is that the claim was made by the daughter against the father on a plea that she had a right by birth. Such a contention is untenable, since there was no right to a daughter by birth under the Hindu Law by the then prevailing provisions at the time of father's death. The daughter has been given the status of a deemed coparcener only in Hindu Succession Act brought through amendment in the year 2005. The right to a share by birth at least cannot be taken to be prima facie possible for a court to grant an interim prayer.
4. The provisions of the Hindu Succession Act at the time of death of the father will make possible certain claims to a female heir under Section 6 Explanations-1 and 2 of the Hindu Succession Act. In fact, the Supreme Court's decision makes a reference to the said provision but was applying it to a widow governed by the Bombay school of Hindu Law. In Punjab, the right to a daughter would not be a share equal to that of father and son at a notional partition by deeming a partition to have taken place which was before the death of the father. If a partition were to have taken place, the sons would be entitled to each a share equal to that of the father which would mean the father had a 1/4th share. If the father was suffering a decree to his grandsons even if it may not operate to the whole extent of the property, it is certainly arguable that the decree will operate in respect of whatever share he had so that it could not be taken at least prima fac
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