The judgment emphasizes the significance of valid reasons and supporting evidence for delay and non-appearance in court proceedings.

1. Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the orders dated 06.11.2008 and 05.04.2011.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had been pursuing his case since the year 1994. Petitioner had led his entire evidence. However, due to his ill health, petitioner could not appear before the trial Court on 07.05.2013. Consequently, application moved by the petitioner for restoration of the case was liable to be allowed. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy, 1998-LAWS(SC) 9-7, wherein it was held as under:

"It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."

3. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on M.K. Prasad versus P. Arumugam, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2497, wherein it was held as under:

"In the instant case, the appellant tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex- parte decree as is evident from his application filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the appellant appears not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but on his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, the court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. We are of the opinion that the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. In the interests of justice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex-parte decree. To avoid further delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex-parte decree as well."

4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand has opposed the petition and has submitted that the Courts below had rightly dismissed the application moved by the petitioner for restoration of the case. In fact, the Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner had taken in consideration the conduct of the petitioner. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on Smt. Dev Bala Sehgal versus Devinder Pal Sehgal, 2001(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 757, wherein it was held as under:

"11. It is abundantly clear that the application in hand for restoration of the suit was not filed within 30 days from the date of dismissal of the suit in default. The Court could not extend the time of limitation by bringing it under the principle of "interest of justice" and by passing the mandatory provisions of Article 122 of the Limitation Act, 1963 Article 122 of the Limitation Act 1963 does not provide that the ap