Mr. Darshan Singh, J. (Oral):- The present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the order dated 30.10.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Bahadurgarh, vide which the application filed by respondent no.4 under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘C.P.C’) for impleading him as a party to the suit has been allowed.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that petitioner-plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 27.12.2004 executed by respondent no.1-Smt. Mewa. Respondent no.4. Ranvir Singh has also alleged that respondent no.1 has executed the agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006 in his favour. He contended that there was no privity of contract between the petitioner-plaintiff and respondent no.4-Ranvir Singh.

3. He contended that a person can only be impleaded as a party to the suit, if, he is a necessary party and in his absence no decree can be passed. He further contended that in the instant case the presence of respondent no.4 is not required to decide the matter in controversy between the petitioner and respondents no.1 to 3. Thus, he was not a necessary party to the suit and the application filed by him has been wrongly allowed by the learned trial Court vide impugned order dated 30.10.2015. To support his contentions, he has relied upon cases, Krishan Lal Vs. Tek Chand, 1986 (2) PLR 616, Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors., 2005(2) R.C.R (Civil) 691 and Ramesh Chandra Pattnaik Vs. Pushpendra Kumari and others, 2008(10) SCC 708.

4. He further contended that respondent no. 4 has already filed the separate suit for specific performance on the basis of the alleged agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006, wherein the petitioner has also been impleaded as a party. So, his presence is not at all necessary in the present suit.

5. I have duly considered the aforesaid contentions.

6. The facts of the present case are peculiar. Petitioner-plaintiff Smt. Santosh is the daughter of respondent no.1-Smt. Mewa, the executant of the agreement. It is alleged that Smt. Mewa has executed the agreement to sell dated 27.12.2004 in favour of the petitioner and on the basis of that agreement she has filed the suit for specific performance against the respondent no. 1-Smt. Mewat. Respondents no. 2 and 3 are stated to be the subsequent purchaser from respondent no.1 vide sale deed dated 24.08.2007. In the application moved by respondent no.4- Ranvir Singh, he has categorically mentioned that the suit filed by petitioner is collusive between her and respondent no.1-Smt. Mewa, her mother. He has also pleaded that in the agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006 executed by respondent no.1 in his favour, petitioner-plaintiff is the attesting witness. Thus, certain peculiar circumstances/facts have cropped up in this case. Particularly keeping in view the close relationship between petitioner and the executant of the agreement to sell.

7. In case Thomson Press (India) Ltd. Vs. Nanak Builders & Investors P. Ltd and others, [2013(2) Law Herald (SC) 1240 : 2013(2) Land L.R. 292 (SC)] : 2013(2) R.C.R (Civil) 875, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down as under:-

“22. In the case of Vidhur Impex (supra), the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to consider all the earlier judgments. The fact of the case was that a suit for specific performance of agreement was filed. The appellants and Bhagwati Developers though totally strangers to the agreement, came into picture only when all the respondents entered into a clandestine transaction with the appellants for sale of the property and executed an agreement of sale which was followed by sale deed. Taking note all the earlier decisions, the Court laid down the broad principles governing the disposal of application for impleadment. Paragraph 36 is worth to be quoted hereinbelow:

“Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgm