Rajiv Narain Raina, J.

The issues which appear to give rise to two substantial questions of law involved for determination in this defendants second appeal are:

[1] As to whether the construction of the revenue entry in the Jamabandi of the year 1877 makes it a gift or an entrustment or a grant by way of a dohli for private religious purposes in lieu of spiritual services rendered to original owner. If it is of the first kind then no restrictions can be imposed by donor on the property and donee (appellant) is free to alienate, lease, rent or deal with the property according to his own choice. If the case falls in the second/third parts then the dohli in favour of the defendant appears to be inalienable in view of restriction placed by owner against sale or mortgage. If it is inalienable then dohlis could not have further leased out disputed property to the third party defendant/appellants in the year 1986. What is the position in law and on facts?

[2] The other substantial question arising is whether the 95 year lease to defendant-8 by the dohlidars amounts to permanent alienation or sale of dohli land and, therefore, falls within the severe restrictions imposed by original owner in the 1877 against sale and thus further long lease from generation to generation in favour of defendant-8 was legally impermissible and ab initio void transaction which could not affect the rights of the true owner or his successors-in-interest to recover property for breach of the terms of the dohli grant?

2. In order to answer the questions, of vital importance is the interpretation to be placed on the revenue entry in the Jamabandi of the year 1877 relied upon by the plaintiffs (owners) as also the defendants (dohlidar and lessee) each according to their own construction and the signification of the terms `sankalp', `samarpan' and `mahsool'/'mahsul' on which the arguments proceeded and centered around.

3. Heard the learned counsel twice over at great length on the two issues. The opinion of this court on the points formulated are as hereafter discussed.

4. The word `sankalp' used in the suit revenue entry has been explained by the predecessor court, the Lahore High Court in Prem Nath and ors. v. Har Ram & ors., AIR 1934 Lahore 771, where the word `sankalp' has been assigned the meaning of `entrusting'. So long there is a clear and unequivocal manifestation of intention to create a trust and there is a formal investing of the ownership in the property on the part of donor and vesting on the same in another or even in the donor himself as a trustee then dedication must be deemed to be complete. The guiding consideration in such cases has been held in Prem Nath's case (supra) is the intention of the maker to divest himself of the property and if it is so then the dedication must be deemed to be complete. Mr Chaudhary appearing for the appellants/dohlidars relies on a selection of judgments bearing five in number to press his case. These are: (i) Dharam Vir v. Bahadur Singh and another, 2007 (1) PLR 176; (ii) Durga Dass alias Dawarka Dass Chela v. Commissioner, Hissar Division, Hisar and others, 2013 (2) PLR 394; (iii) Prem Nath and others v. Har Ram and others, AIR 1934 Lahore 771; (iv) Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das and others, AIR 1938 Lahore 686; (v) Dharam Singh and others v. Smt. Phullan Devi and others, and a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Ismail and others v. Waris Ali, (1886) ILR 8 All 552 comprising Hon'ble Oldfield and Hon'ble Syed Mahmood, JJ., Hon'ble Justice Mahmood dissenting, unable to concur with Justice Richard Charles Oldfield by dismissing the suit and decreeing the appeal in a comprehensive judgment delivered. Oldfield, J. held that there was no rent-free grant at all in the sense contemplated by section 30 of the Rent Act, and the one filed cannot be held to be a suit to resume a rent-free grant, in which matters revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction, the parties having litigated before