The judgment emphasized the need for sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and highlighted the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in previous cases.

AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J.

1. Challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) is to the judgment dated 11.5.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby CWP No. 3558 of 1987 filed by the respondents was allowed.

2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal as narrated therein may be noticed. The appellant had framed 17 Town Planning Schemes (in short “the Scheme”) for the development of the town under Section 192 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The present case relates to Town Planning Scheme No. 3 Part 2. The said Scheme was quashed by the learned Judge vide impugned judgment dated 11.5.2011. As per the rough site plan (Annexure A-1) and the photographs (Annexure A-2), the said Scheme had already been impleaded to the extent of 98% by spending crores of rupees and the other remained un-implemented on account of pendency of cases in various courts. According to the appellant, the Scheme was framed and published earlier as the respondents had purchased the property from Gian Chand. The Scheme in question was sanctioned in the year 1983. The declaration as un-built area was passed by the appellant on 23.8.1975 and the same was confirmed by the State Government on 21.10.1975. In the local area, the Scheme was published on 25.5.1979 and thereafter, the objections were invited. Finally the Scheme was sent to the State Government on 27.2.1981 and the approval thereof was granted on 31.8.1983. However, the respondents had never filed the objections. This Court vide impugned order dated 11.5.2011 allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents and quashed the Scheme in question. Hence, the present Letters Patent Appeal. As the appeal is barred by limitation, CM No. 3053-LPA of 2016 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the “1963 Act”) has been filed for condonation of 1760 days' delay in filing the appeal whereas CM No. 3049-LPA of 2016 has been filed for condonation of 85 days' delay in refiling the appeal.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.

4. The preliminary question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 1760 days in filing and 85 days in refiling the appeal.

5. Examining the legal position relating to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, it may be observed that the Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 laying down the broad principles for adjudicating the issue of condonation of delay, in paras 14 & 15 observed as under:-

“14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil.”

6. It was further noticed by the Apex Court in R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (1)