IMPORTANT POINT
Possession – Suit filed by a religious institution for a declaration of its title to the property and for possession of the same from the defendants who are in possession thereof under a void lease deeds – Such a suit would fall outside the scope of Section 92 CPC.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

1. By this judgment, Regular Second Appeal Nos.3642, 3643 and 3661 of 2004 and Regular Second Appeal No. 4408 of 2017 are being disposed of.

2. Dispute in the present case is with regard to validity of lease deeds executed by one late Sh. Harbhajan Dass as “Khidhmatgujar” (Obedient servant) of Dera Granth Sahib Dera Devi Talab, which is a religious institution, for a period of 99 years. These lease deeds were challenged by the plaintiff i.e. the religious institution on various grounds.

3. Both the Courts after appreciating the evidence available on the file decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. Hence defendants are in appeal.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and with their able assistance gone through the judgments passed by the courts below and record of the case.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted as under:-

(1) The permission granted by the trial Court while entertaining the suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was illegal;

(2) Will-a testamentary document in favour of Taran Dass is not proved in accordance with Section 63(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and, therefore, Mahant Taran Dass is not proved to be Mahant of the plaintiff-Dera;

(3) Tenants have raised construction after getting the property on the lease and therefore, their rights cannot be prejudiced;

(4) The suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation as lease deeds were in the knowledge of the plaintiffs and Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act provides for limitation of 3 years from the date cause of action first accrues;

(5) The petitioners are tenants holding over and therefore, suit for possession was not maintainable.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that both the Courts have found that the lease deeds were executed by late Sh. Harbhajan Dass who had no authority to execute the lease deeds on behalf of the religious institution. He has further submitted that lease deeds for a period of 99 years amounts to permanent alienation of religious property which is not ordinarily permissible. He has further submitted that once the lease deeds were executed by unauthorised person, therefore, the lease deeds were void-ab-intio and not required to be challenged. He has submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is for possession and the alleged lease deeds can be ignored by the Courts as these were void-ab initio.

FINDINGS

7. With regard to first argument of learned counsel, it is relevant to note here that suits under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with certain specific reliefs. In the present case, plaintiffs had filed a suit claiming possession of the property on the ground that one “Khidhmatgujar” has acted against the interest of the religious institution and failed to take action to safeguard its interest. In the considered opinion of this Court, the suit filed by a religious institution for a declaration of its title to the property and for possession of the same from the defendants who are in possession thereof under a void lease deeds is not one of the relief found under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a suit would fall outside the scope of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble supreme Court reported as Bishwanath and another v. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji and others, AIR 1967 SC 1044. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

“(7) It is settled law that to invoke s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 3 conditions have to be satisfied, namely, (i) the trust is created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature;, (ii) there was a breach of trust or a direction of court is necessary in the administration of such a trust; and (iii) the relief claimed is one or other of the reliefs enumerated therein. If any of the 3 conditions is not satisfied, the suit falls outside the scope of the said s