The main legal point established in the judgment is the principle of equality and fair compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the court's emphasis on upholding the rights of landowners to receive fair compensation for acquired land.

G.S. Sandhawalia, J.

The Union of India has challenged the order dated 27.10.2017 (Annexure P-3) under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India whereby respondent No.1 has allowed the application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short 'the Act') and granted enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs.2300/- per marla.

2. The same was done on the basis of the application dated 12.05.2016 (Annexure P-1) by the landowners-private respondents which was filed on the strength of the decision in RFA No.2902 of 1999 titled as Union of India Vs. Major Pritam Singh and others whereby this Court, vide order dated 17.02.2016 had enhanced the compensation to Rs.2300/- per marla from Rs.1400/- per marla as granted by the Reference Court as per the award dated 22.03.1999.

3. The argument which is raised by the Union of India is that in view of the fact that SLP as such has been filed and leave has been granted on 15.12.2017 against the order passed in Major Pritam Singh's case (supra), the landowners should not get the said benefits and the matter should be kept pending till the decision of SLP by the Apex Court. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment dated 12.12.2017 of Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.21792 of 2017 “Bharatsing S/o Gulabsingh Jakhad and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others”, in support of this contention.

4. After hearing the counsel for the Union of India, this Court is of the opinion that Union of India cannot be granted benefits for delay caused by it and deny payment of enhanced compensation to the landowners.

5. Admittedly, private respondents had chosen not to file the reference petition under Section 18 of the Act against the award dated 15.03.1993 of the Special Land Acquisition Collector. Only on account of fact that the amount was further enhanced in appeal by this Court in Major Pritam Singh's case (supra), they filed the applications immediately thereafter within 3 months. In reply filed by the Union of India, no such plea was taken that the respondents had chosen to contest the order in Major Pritam Singh's case (supra). The matter remained pending before the Collector also for a period of one year thereafter and no additional affidavit and supplementary stand was taken by the Union of India.

6. Eventually, the order dated 27.10.2017 came to be passed in favour of the landowners and relief has been granted in view of Major Pritam Singh's case (supra). In such circumstances, the order as such which is now been impugned of the Land Acquisition Collector, does not suffer from any infirmity. Merely because the Union of India has chosen to file SLP at the subsequent stage, the benefit of enhanced compensation as such cannot be denied to the landowners.

7. The Union of India is well protected in as much as Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Munshi Ram (deceased) through LRs, 2006(2) RCR (Civil) 763 has held that in case of reduction of compensation by the superior Courts, the applicants under Section 28-A may be directed to refund the excess amount if received by them. The relevant portion reads as under:

“9. We hold that under Section 28-A of the Act, the compensation payable to the applicants is the same which is finally payable to those claimants who sought reference under Section 18 of the Act. In case of reduction of compensation by the superior Courts, the applicants under Section 28-A may be directed to refund the excess amount received by them in the light of reduced compensation finally awarded.”

8. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the principle laid down in V. Ramakrishna Rao Vs. The Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. and another, 2010(10) SCC 650 that Section 28A is only incorporated for the purpose of goal of equality and to remove the inequality in payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition of land under the principle of eminent domain. The relevant portion reads as under:

“9. The above reproduced provision represents the Legislature's determin