The court emphasized the statutory duty of the Guardian Judge to regulate the conduct and proceedings of the guardian and to ensure the enforcement of the order, considering the welfare of the minor child, as per Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

M.M.S. BEDI, J.

1. This is an appeal against an order dated 5.3.2018 purported to be under Section 47 (i) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 though the impugned order has not been passed specifically under Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

2. Perusal of the file indicates that the respondent-husband had filed an application under Section 25(9) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 seeking visitation rights besides claiming custody of the minor child. The said matter was compromised before the Guardian Judge, Chandigarh. Vide order dated 15.12.2014, Annexure P-1, on the statements of the parties, the matter was amicable settled and the permanent custody of the minor child was handed over to the respondent-husband in the Court by the appellant-wife, however, reserving her right of visitation as per her convenience, four times in a month with prior intimation to the respondent-husband telephonically.

3. Complaining that the respondent-husband was not adhering to the terms of the settlement, a miscellaneous application was filed by the appellant-wife for modification of order dated 15.12.2014. Copy of the application has been placed on record as Annexure P-3. Contents of the application are indicative of the fact that the appellant-wife had gone to meet the minor child on different occasions, when she was misbehaved by hurling filthy abuses as mentioned in her application. She claimed that she was not being allowed to meet the minor child intentionally by the respondent-husband. The learned Guardian Judge has dismissed the application vide impugned order dated 5.3.2018 on a technical ground that the application for seeking modification of the order dated 15.12.2014 was not maintainable in view of provisions of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. We have considered the contents of the said application, which has been dismissed by the Guardian Judge, Chandigarh and also the contents of the application filed by the appellant-wife in the light of provisions of Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which empowers a Guardian Court to regulate the conduct as well as the proceedings of any guardian appointed or declared by the Court. In this case, the dispute is inter se the natural guardians of the minor child, which was determined on the basis of the terms settled between them. The application regarding guardianship and custody of the minor child had been decided as per the terms of settlement arrived at between the parties. On account of the terms being implemented in letter and spirit, the appellant-wife had opted to file an application. It appears that the title and prayer of the application were happily worded though the contents of the application are indicative of the fact that the appellant-wife wanted regulation of the conduct of the respondent-husband as per the terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties.

5. The function of a Court, especially the Guardian Judge, does cease to exist after passing an order but the objective of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is to ensure the welfare of the minor child and to further supervise and regulate the conduct of the guardian and for enforcement of the order passed by the Guardian Judge. Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 reads as follows:-

"43. Orders for regulating conduct or proceedings of guardians, and enforcement of those orders:-

1. The Court may, on the application of any person interested or of its own motion, make an order regulating the conduct or proceedings of any guardian appointed or declared by the Court.

2. Where there are more guardians than one of a ward and they are unable to agree upon a question affecting his welfare, any of them may apply to the Court for its direction, and the Court may make such order respecting the matter in difference as it thinks fit.

3. Except where it appears that the object of making an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) would be defeated by the delay, the Court sh