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2017 Supreme(P&H) 2555
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Amol Rattan Singh, J.
Director Marketing Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited – Appellant
Vs.
Vipin Sukhija – Respondent
RSA No. 1611, 1617 and 1683 of 2016
Decided On : 16-06-2017
For the Appellant :Raman Sharma, Advocate
For the Respondent:Anil Malhotra, Advocate
A tenant who continues to occupy the premises after the termination of the lease agreement is not a statutory tenant under the Rent Act if the tenant is not in physical possession of the suit property.
Headnote:
The appellant, a petroleum corporation, entered into a lease agreement with the respondent, a landowner, for a period of 20 years, with an option to renew for a further period of 20 years. After the initial lease period expired, the appellant continued to occupy the premises as a statutory tenant under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (the "Rent Act"). The respondent filed three suits against the appellant: one seeking mandatory injunction for removal of the appellant's infrastructure from the suit land, one seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering in the respondent's ownership and possessory rights over the suit land, and one seeking mandatory and permanent injunction restraining the appellant from dispossessing the respondent from the suit property. The trial court decreed all three suits in favor of the respondent, and the appellate court dismissed the appellant's appeals. The appellant then filed three second appeals before the High Court.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a petroleum corporation, entered into a lease agreement with the respondent, a landowner, for a period of 20 years, with an option to renew for a further period of 20 years. After the initial lease period expired, the appellant continued to occupy the premises as a statutory tenant under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (the "Rent Act"). The respondent filed three suits against the appellant: one seeking mandatory injunction for removal of the appellant's infrastructure from the suit land, one seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering in the respondent's ownership and possessory rights over the suit land, and one seeking mandatory and permanent injunction restraining the appellant from dispossessing the respondent from the suit property. The trial court decreed all three suits in favor of the respondent, and the appellate court dismissed the appellant's appeals. The appellant then filed three second appeals before the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the appellant was not a statutory tenant under the Rent Act because it was not in physical possession of the suit property after the termination of the license agreement. The Court also held that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, were applicable to the State of Haryana and that the appellant was required to remove its infrastructure from the suit land in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellant was a statutory tenant under the Rent Act after the termination of the lease agreement? 2. Whether the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, were applicable to the State of Haryana? 3. Whether the appellant was required to remove its infrastructure from the suit land in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the appellant was not a statutory tenant under the Rent Act because it was not in physical possession of the suit property after the termination of the license agreement. The Court reasoned that the appellant's deemed possession of the suit property ceased with the revocation of the license, and that the respondent's physical possession of the premises would be treated as actual possession. 2. The Court held that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, were applicable to the State of Haryana because the State Government had issued a gazette notification in 1955 extending the provisions of the Act to the State, including the present State of Haryana. The Court also noted that the State Government had issued another gazette notification in 1957 extending the provisions of the Act to the erstwhile areas of PEPSU, which had merged into the State of Punjab. 3. The Court held that the appellant was required to remove its infrastructure from the suit land in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement. The Court reasoned that the lease agreement required the appellant to remove all buildings, structures, plant, and other property belonging to it upon the expiration of the lease.
Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeals and upheld the judgments and decrees of the lower courts. The Court also imposed costs of Rs. 5000/- on the appellant in each appeal.
Amol Rattan Singh, J.
These three regular second appeals all essentially arise out of a dispute emanating from a lease deed entered into between the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants in all these appeals, i.e. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent, Vipin Sukhija, registered on 03.11.1966.
The lease deed was executed between Sh. Guraditta Ram and Sh. Mohan Lal Sukhija (lessors) with M/s Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Company of India, qua land admeasuring 6972 square feet, falling on National Highway no.10, Mandi Dabwali, District Sirsa.
The lease deed was for a period of 20 years, with the monthly rental being Rs. 175/-, with a clause therein that if the parties were agreed, the lease would be renewed and, as per the respondent herein, it was renewed upto 30.06.2005 with the successor of the Burmah Shell Company, i.e. the present appellant, M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company' or Corporation). The relationship of lessee and lessor between the successor company and the original lessors and their successor in interest, is admitted by the present respondent also, i.e. Vipin Sukhija.
It is also not disputed that the land owners, i.e. the lessors, also became licencees of the lessee company, as regards the sale of the products of the company, i.e. diesel, petrol and other petroleum products, which were to be sold by the lessor-licensee from the suit property itself, i.e. the aforesaid plot admeasuring 6972 square feet.
Thus, as per the respondent herein, effective control over the suit land remained with the lessors through their firm, to which the licence was granted by the appellant Corporation.
The contention of the respondent is that after the lease stood finally determined on 30.06.2005, he became the sole owner of the site and therefore, he instituted Civil Suit no.7-C of 2009 on 02.01.2009, seeking therein a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants (present appellants), to remove their infrastructure from the suit land.
5 days after the institution of that suit, the respondent herein also instituted Civil Suit no.29-C of 2009 on 07.01.2009, seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Corporation and its employees (defendants) from interfering in his ownership and possessory rights over the suit land.
21 days thereafter, i.e. on 28.01.2009, the appellant Corporation filed Civil Suit no.72-C of 2009, seeking a decree of mandatory and permanent injunction against the present respondent, injuncting him from dispossessing the Corporation from the suit property by force, and from causing any damage to the structure, machinery, dispensing units, tanks, canopy etc. and from interfering in any manner whatsoever, except in due course of law, over the suit property. A further direction was also sought that the defendant (present respondent) be directed to remove the wall erected on the site, on the side of the "GT road". A consequential relief of permanent injunction, restraining the defendant from causing any type of interference in the statutory tenancy rights of the Corporation (plaintiff in that civil suit), was also sought.
2. Though all the suits are seen to be decided on the same date by the same Court, i.e. the Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Div.), Dabwali, on 29.03.2014, separate judgments have been passed in each suit.
Both the suits of the land owner, i.e. respondent Vipin Sukhija, bearing numbers 7-C and 29-C of 2009, were decreed in his favour, whereas the suit filed by the appellant Corporation, bearing no.72-C, was dismissed. The appellant Corporation therefore filed 3 appeals against the aforesaid judgments and decrees of the learned Civil Judge, which were all dismissed vide separate judgments on the same date, i.e. 30.11.2015, by the learned Ist Appellate Court, i.e. the Additional
