Subsequent purchasers who acquire property during the pendency of a suit have the right to participate in the suit as co-sharers, and the principles of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, apply to such transactions.

RITU BAHRI, J.

1. Present petition has been filed for setting aside the impugned order dated 10.11.2015 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Charkhi Dadri, whereby the application of the petitioners-plaintiffs under Order 1, Rule 10 and Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected.

2. Petitioners-plaintiffs had filed a suit (Annexure P-1) for declaration on the ground that the property measuring 109 kanal 6 marla given in the head note of the plaint is joint Hindu family coparcener property and the petitioners-plaintiffs are having their birthright which is ?rd share i.e 72 kanal 16 marla and they are entitled to get separate possession by partition. Further prayer was made for permanent injunction restraining the respondent-defendant to alienate in the form of sale, gift, mortgage or by any other means of the property in dispute. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent-defendant Sheo Narain had sold out some part of the suit property to vendees namely, Krishan Devi, Dharmal Devi and Nirmala Devi vide registered sale deed no. 3279 dated 27.10.2011. Accordingly an application under Order 1, Rule 10 and Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for amending the plaint and for impleading the aforesaid vendees as defendants in the present suit was made. The application has been dismissed by the trial Court by making reference to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, 2007(2) LJR 565, wherein a suit for specific performance of a contract has been filed by the plaintiff against one Rajeshwari Devi. A further declaration was sought to the effect that defendant no. 1 had no right to execute four sale deeds in favour of defendants no. 2, 3, 4 and 5. During the pendency of suit, a temporary injunction was granted in favour of the appellant. After the order of injunction was passed, some transfers were made by the defendants. The subsequent purchasers filed an application in terms of Order 1, Rule 10 (2) CPC for impleadment to contest the suit and to permit them to file written statement. The trial Court rejected the prayer for implement by holding that the transfer was pendente lite and was clearly hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Against the order of the trial Court, a writ petition was filed before the High Court which was allowed holding that the respondents' vendors were not parties to the suit and there was nobody to represent and safeguard their interest and therefore they are required to be added as parties in the suit for the ends of justice. Order of the High Court was challenged in an SLP before the Supreme Court which was allowed and it was observed in paragraph 12 as under:

"The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienation's are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court."

3. However, in the above said case, Hon'ble the Supreme Court was not dealing with the case where a co-share had filed a suit for partition. In the case of Rupesh Singh v. Pitamber