The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the statutory requirements for eviction based on personal necessity, including the obligation to disclose possession of other properties and the impact of family ownership on the landlord's claim for eviction.

AJAY TEWARI, J.

1. This revision has been filed against concurrent judgments of the Courts below ordering eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute.

2. The respondent had filed a petition for eviction on the ground that he required the demises premises to settle his 21 year old son who wanted to open a Gym in the premises. This contention having been accepted by both the Courts the petitioner-tenant is before this Court.

3. Learned senior counsel has raised two arguments. His first argument is that the landlord-respondent did not disclose that he possessed numerous other properties and this is fatal to his claim. A perusal of the judgments of the Courts below reveal that the Courts have taken into consideration the fact that the properties were originally owned by the father of the landlord and he had nine other brothers and sisters and, therefore, the authorities held that even though some of them may be lying vacant it could not be said that they were in the possession of the landlord. Learned senior counsel has argued that it is well settled that the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all the co-sharers and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the authorities to have held that the respondent was in possession of those vacant properties and his non-disclosure disentitles him from relief. In this context he has relied upon Mrs. Jaspreet Takhar v Ghai Enterprises and others reported as , 2013(1) PLR 765 and Ravinder Sood and another v. Mohan Lal reported as, 2013(1) PLR 722. In the case of Mrs. Jaspreet Takhar (supra) this Court observed as follows:--

"I agree with the contention of the tenant that the landlord was guilty of serious suppression of material fact. As a measure of essential pleading mandated through the express provision, which I have referred to above as regards the existence or otherwise of any other building, cannot be allowed to be merely a matter elicited in the cross examination. If the land-lady was admitting the existence of yet another building in the cross-examination, it is another way of stating that she was forced to admit the same although there was no pleading regarding the same. The argument made by the learned Senior Counsel that the other property in her possession was for her professional requirement as an Architect, which cannot be used for running shop, is more the explanation of a counsel than the explanation for the party. I have gone through the evidence and there is no statement anywhere uttered by her that the property in her possession under a demise cannot be put to use for her Pottery business as well. If the petitioner had specifically made reference to the existence of a shop and was pleading that the property in her occupation held under demise was not suitable for Pottery business then it would not become possible for the tenant to join issues on such aspect and brought specific evidence. The absence of pleading by the petitioner cannot be a matter of advantage for the landlord and she cannot hope the Court to make a conjecture that a premise that is available with her for carrying on a profession cannot be used by her for carrying on the newly intended commercial proposition.............................................. "

In Ravinder Sood's case (supra) this Court observed as follows:--

"All that the landlord requiring an ejectment of residential building could be required to show in his pleading is that he is not occupying "any residential building" in the urban areas concerned and he has not vacated said building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act besides showing that the building is required for his own occupation. The consideration of whether the landlord is occupying another residential building is seen from the context of whether such another building is sufficient for his own requirement. A mere possession of another building may not disentitle a landlord to seek for ejectment for his bona fide requirement. The typical e