AMOL RATTAN SINGH, J.

1. By this petition, the petitioner, who is the judgment debtor in a suit filed by the respondent herein, (with the decree holder having sought a decree of specific performance of an agreement of sale), challenges the order of the learned execution Court, by which his objections against the execution proceedings stand dismissed.

Very briefly, the suit of the respondent-plaintiff had been decreed in his favour, holding that the agreement of sale executed by the petitioner herein, in favour of the respondent-plaintiff-decree holder, dated 20.04.2005, qua a residential house measuring 210 sq. yards [fully described in the plaint and the judgment of the trial Court (copy Annexure P-1)], was a proved document, pursuant to which he was bound to execute a sale deed qua the house in favour of the plaintiff, upon the plaintiff fulfilling the terms and conditions of the said agreement. The petitioner had also been restrained from alienating the suit property in any manner.

That judgment became final upto this Court after Regular Second Appeal no.4126 of 2016, filed by the petitioner, was dismissed on 16.08.2016.

Hence, upon execution proceedings having been initiated by the respondent-decree holder, the petitioner had filed objections, essentially stating that he was more than 60 yeas old, with no source of earning and livelihood, and if the property, which was his sole residential house, was also sold to the decree holder, he would have no place to live in.

The learned execution Court, upon hearing arguments of the parties, held that the said objection, if it were to be taken, should have been taken in proceedings in the suit itself, and not at the stage of execution, where the execution court cannot go beyond the decree issued.

2. When this petition was filed on 12.05.2017 the following order was recorded by this Court:-

“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that suit property is the only residential house of the petitioner and if the decree is executed, petitioner would come on road. Referring to the duly sworn affidavit dated 17.04.2017 filed by the petitioner in compliance of the order dated 6.4.2017 passed by this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner is ready to pay back an amount of Rs.10,50,000/- along with interest @ 9% from 20th April, 2005, till the date of actual payment, and not @ 6%, as pointed out in para 3 of the affidavit.

Notice of motion for 30.08.2017.

Process dasti as well as through the counsel for the respondent before the learned executing court, in addition to ordinary process.

In the meanwhile, dispossession of the petitioner from his residential house shall remain stayed.”

3. Thus, notice of motion had been issued on the statement of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner would be ready to pay back Rs.10,50,000/- along with interest @ 9% per annum, running from the date of the agreement of sale.

The matter thereafter kept getting adjourned, and when it came up for arguments, Mr. Gurcharan Dass, learned counsel for the petitioner, had argued that the suit property being the sole residential house of the petitioner, sale thereof, even to satisfy the decree, would be barred in terms of Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as applicable to Punjab).

Though this Court even at that stage had observed that the said provision would not be applicable where the residential house was the subject matter of the decree itself, the provision being applicable only if such a house is sought to be attached/sold to satisfy a decree other than that in which the house was the suit property, learned counsel had sought time to address arguments on that point.

In fact, at that stage, this Court had not noticed the order dated 12.05.2017, wherein, in fact, notice had been issued on the petitioners' contention that the petitioner would pay back Rs.10,50,000/- with interest.

4. Be that as it may, in support of the aforesaid argument, Mr. Gurcharan Das