The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and Section 409 IPC, specifically regarding the stipulated periods for completion of investigation and presentation of challan, and the influence of the punishment provided under Section 409 IPC on the period for release on bail.

JUDGMENT :

Shekher Dhawan, J.

Challenge in the above titled two revision petitions is to the orders dated 12.06.2019 and 13.06.2019 passed by learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar whereby applications for bail under Section 167(2) (a)(i) and (ii) of Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioners were dismissed. Therefore, both these revision petitions are being taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. For facility of reference, facts are being taken from CRR1504-2019. FIR No. 76 dated 11.4.2019 was registered against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Amended Act 2018), (for short, "the Act") and subsequently, Sections 409 and 120-B IPC were added. After expiry of period of 60 days, an application for grant of bail on default clause was filed on the ground that report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has not been filed within the stipulated period of 60 days. So, the petitioner be released on bail.

3. Learned trial Judge after hearing both the sides passed detailed order dated 12.06.2019 to the effect that stipulated period for presentation of challan in this case was 90 days and not 60 days as per the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(i) as the sentence provided for the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC is Imprisonment for life as well and in that case, the period stipulated for presentation of challan is 90 days which had not expired at the time of filing of the bail application before the Judge, Special Court, Amritsar.

4. At the time of arguments, learned senior counsel representing the petitioners raised two-fold arguments. Firstly, it is contended that report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has not been filed within stipulated period of 60 days as provided under Section 167(2)(a)(ii) Cr.P.C. where period is prescribed as 60 days for completion of investigation. Secondly, it is contended the offence under Section 409 IPC is not made out in this case. But, mainly, the argument raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioners is on the point of release of the petitioners on bail on the basis of non-compliance of provisions as contained in Section 167 Cr.P.C.

5. Learned counsel for the petitions has placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India through C.B.I. Vs. Nirala Yadav @ Raja Ram Yadav @ Deepak Yadav, (2014) 3 RCR(Criminal) 534, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that the Court is to see rights of the parties regarding release of accused on bail on completion of stipulated period and the said right is not frustrated after filing of final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. after stipulated period and before filing of the application, unless application for extension of time is allowed by the Magistrate.

6. Learned senior counsel also placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajeev Chaudhary Vs. State (N.C.T.) of Delhi, (2001) 2 RCR(Criminal) 754 wherein view was taken that the case would fall under Section 167(2)(a)(ii) where punishment provided is upto 10 years.

7. Learned State counsel has fairly stated that the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was not filed within 60 days, but the same was filed before the Court below within 90 days as the period prescribed in the present case is 90 days. She further contended that the case of the petitioner falls under Section 167(2)(a)(i) where the period provided for presentation of challan is 90 days. As regards to commission of offence under Section 409 IPC, the said Section has been added during investigation and on facts also, the present case is a one, where the petitioner allegedly committed offence under Section 409 IPC as he was using the property which was with him as trust property as the Car was deposited in the malkhana.

8. Learned State counsel further contended that in identical matter was before Hon'ble Apex Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2013) 3 SCC 77 and Hon'ble Apex Court had taken the view that