The management has the authority to consider the case and make a decision based on the regulations governing service conditions, and the mere acquittal of the petitioner does not automatically entitle him to have the suspension period treated as 'spent on duty'.

JUDGMENT

Jaspal Singh, J. (Oral) - By virtue of instant petition preferred under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order dated 01.08.2012 (P-3) to the extent of regularization of the period of suspension as leave of kind due as well as order dated 16.05.2013 (P- 8) whereby, a statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 01.08.2012 has been dismissed with further direction for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the period of his suspension from 11.11.1994 to 11.06.1995 as "spent on duty", and to regularise the same accordingly and to release the amount of leave encashment against the available due earned leave.

2. Assailing the impugned orders, it has been argued with vehemence by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was placed under suspension vide office order 912, dated 11.11.1994 (P-1) on account of registration of FIR No.88, dated 06.11.1995, under Sections 420, 466, 467, 468, 471, 477-A and 120-B IPC, at Police Station Goindwal Sahib, District Tarn Taran. However, after facing prolonged trial for more than 10 years, petitioner was acquitted of the charges by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Tarn Taran vide judgment dated 21.09.2010 (P-5). Even, an appeal preferred by the respondents against order of acquittal dated 21.09.2010 (P-5) was also dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Tarn Taran vide judgment dated 24.10.2011 (P-6). Subsequent thereto, petitioner approached the respondents/punishing authority to drop the proceedings on the basis of charge sheet dated 17.01.1995 and to regularize the period of his suspension from 11.11.1994 to 11.06.1995 and grant him the leave encashment. However, even though the proceedings were dropped but the period of suspension was treated as 'leave of kind due" instead of duty vide impugned order dated 01.08.2012 (P-3). Aggrieved, against the impugned order dated 01.08.2012 (P-3), petitioner preferred a statutory appeal which was also dismissed vide order dated 16.05.2013 (P-8).

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that while passing the afore-said impugned orders by the concerned authorities it weighed in their mind that the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges by giving "benefit of doubt", as the prosecution has not produced the relevant register in the Court. But while referring rule 7.3 of the Punjab State Electricity Board Main Service Regulations, 1975 Volume-I (for short 'Service Regulations'), learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it provides as to how the allowances on reinstatement of a suspended employee are to be regulated and as per rule 7.3 (2) of the ibid Service Regulations where the petitioner has been fully exonerated he is entitled to the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsory retired or suspended, as the case may be. In fact the authorities while passing the impugned orders have not taken into consideration the afore-said rules as well as principles governing the regularization of suspension period.

4. He further contended that once an employee is acquitted of the charges either for want of evidence or on technical ground after having been given benefit of doubt, he is entitled to be treated on duty and he is entitled to all the benefits on his retirement. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Bhag Singh v. Punjab and Sindh Bank; 2006 (1) SCT 175 ; Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh; 2015 (1) SCT 87 and Shashi Kumar v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd; 2005 (1) SCT 576 , which are subsequent relied upon by this Court in Lakshmi Narain v. State of Haryana and another; 2017 (1) SCT 756.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has controverted the various