The main legal point established in the judgment is that the determination of rash, negligent driving, and intention are matters of evidence to be decided by the trial court.

JUDGMENT

Daya Chaudhary, J. - The present petition has been filed under Section 439 Cr.P.C., 1973 for grant of regular bail to petitioner-Harjasneet Singh Chahal in case FIR No. 139 dated 6.8.2017 registered under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC (Section 304 IPC added later on) at Police Station North Sector-3, Chandigarh.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in this case, whereas, no offence is made out under Section 304 IPC. Initially the FIR was registered for offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC but Section 304 IPC was added subsequently. As per allegations in the FIR, death has occurred due to rash and negligent act of the driver of offending vehicle bearing registration No. PB-03F-0004. Learned counsel further contends that the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC are bailable but just to make the offence non-bailable offence under Section 304 IPC has been added and ultimately the challan has also been presented under Section 304 IPC. Learned counsel also contends that this Court while dismissing the anticipatory bail petition of the petitioner on 20.12.2017 gave a direction that in case the petitioner surrenders before the trial Court and applies for regular bail, the same shall be decided within a period of one week. The petitioner is in custody since 22.3.2018 and no purpose would be served by keeping him in custody as investigation has been concluded and challan has also been presented. The regular bail application has been dismissed by the trial Court without taking into consideration the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner. It is also the argument of learned counsel that there is no cogent evidence to establish any criminal knowledge as both the witnesses introduced by the prosecution, namely, Arjun Goyal and Abhijeet Kaplish have stated only about the rash and negligent act of the petitioner. Even the identity of the driver of the offending vehicle would be a moot question to be decided during course of the trial. At the end, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is ready to abide by all the terms and conditions to be imposed by this Court or by the trial Court.

3. Learned counsel for U.T., Chandigarh has opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner by contending that the order passed by this Court in the anticipatory bail petition is well reasoned and detailed one and same has been upheld by Hon'ble the Apex Court. Learned counsel further contends that the accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the car as he was driving the vehicle at a very high speed. Initially the petitioner was released on bail by the police but subsequently on moving an application by daughter of the deceased and after seeking opinion of the senior officers and receipt of CFSL report Section 304 IPC was added and the petitioner was arrested on 25.3.2018. The offending vehicle was being driven at the speed of 64 kms per hour, whereas, the permissible speed is 40 kms per hour. The petitioner after hitting the injured fled away from the place of occurrence without providing any help to the victim and thereafter he could not be traced out in spite of making best efforts by the police for two days and accordingly it could not be ascertained whether he was driving the vehicle under the influence of the liquor or otherwise.

4. Learned counsel for the complainant has reiterated the arguments advanced by learned counsel for U.T., Chandigarh and submits that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of bail as the injured/deceased raised his hand to stop the vehicle but the petitioner did not bother even to slow down the speed. The petitioner was not only negligent but rash also in driving the offending vehicle as it was being driven at a high speed at the busy place. Learned counsel further contends that charge under Section 304 Part II IPC was framed against the petitioner and his