Substantive rights should not be defeated on technical grounds, and procedural irregularities are curable to ensure that injustice is not done to any party with a just case.

JUDGMENT

Amit Rawal, J. (Oral) - The Punjab Wakf Board is in appeal against the concurrent finding of fact whereby the suit seeking possession by way of ejectment of the respondent has been dismissed on technical ground of not having valid resolution or authority.

2. The facts as pleaded in the suit and defence of the defendants are not disputed. However, brief facts are described herein below.

3. Wakf Board claiming ownership of the suit property sought possession of the same by way of ejectment on the premise that tenancy of defendants was terminated.

4. The suit aforementioned was filed through Secretary Sh. K. Sheikh Ahmad. It was averred that the suit property/plot comprising of khasra No.3923 situated in the area of Patti Musalmanan, Sonepat was rented out to defendants on monthly rent of Rs. 20/- per month.

5. The defendants contested the suit by raising the plea of tenancy to be of permanent nature, much less, the same was not terminated in a legal manner. Even the suit was not filed by duly authorized person. It was averred that in the year 1952, the suit property was leased out to Faquir Chand, father of the defendant No.1, who had constructed a portion of Sarang Cinema and two shops, which was never objected to by the Wakf Bard. A sum of Rs. 20,000/- was invested by his father. Later on, another sum of Rs. 40,000/-was invested.

6. Replication was filed by the plaintiff denying the tenancy to be permanent in nature but stated that it was month to month and the suit was said to be filed by duly authorized person.

7. Since the parties were at variance, the trial Court framed the following issues:-

"1. Whether the present suit has been filed by a duly authorized person? OPP

2. Whether the property in question was let out to the defendant at a monthly rent of Rs. 20/- as alleged? Opp

3. Whether the tenancy of the defendant was validly terminated by legal notice as alleged? OPP

4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD

5. Relief.

8. On preponderance of evidence brought on record i.e. notification dated 19.08.1987, the trial Court found that the Wakf Board was superseded by the Department and supersession was extended from 1.9.1987 to 22.2.1988 whereas the suit was filed on 10.11.1987, therefore, it was the Principal Secretary, who was authorized to exercise the power, thus, the suit was held to be not filed by competent authority. The appeal filed before the lower Appellate Court was also dismissed.

9. Mr. G.S. Bhatia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in support of the memorandum of appeal submitted that both the Courts below erred in giving finding on issue No.3 against the appellant by relying upon the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In fact, provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to Punjab and Haryana. The defendants admitted the tenancy and the only point to be considered was whether there was a valid termination of the tenancy. The suit was filed by the then Secretary and therefore, there is gross illegality and perversity.

10. Per contra, Mr. Kunal Vinayak for Mr. S.K. Bansal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-defendants supported the judgments and decrees of the Courts below on the premise that the finding of fact and law arrived at by the Courts below leaves no manner of doubt that the Secretary, K. Sheikh Ahmad had no authority or power to institute the suit, owing to the super-session of the Wakf Board whose control was taken over by the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, Government of Haryana. The super-session continued during the filing of the suit and therefore, the Principal Secretary of the Government had power to file the suit. The suit was, therefore, not filed by the competent person and had rightly been dismissed. The provisions of local Rent Act were applicable as the plaintiff miserably failed to prove that property was not governed by the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Pr